 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Tesoro Petroleum Corporation v. State2/15/2002
section (e). This can readily be accomplished by construing subsection (e) as requiring that the attorney general's designee be a person who qualifies for disclosure of CID material. In other words, the designee must either be an authorized employee or a person authorized to receive disclosures by a court order following a showing of good cause. Similarly, the term "representatives" used in subsection (b)(4) should mean, if all the terms of the statute are to be harmonized, either authorized employees or persons authorized by a court to receive disclosures.
The final sentence of subsection (e) provides that the attorney general or his designee "may use copies of the documentary material as he considers necessary in the enforcement of this chapter, including presentation before a court . . . ." There is a tension between this provision and the disclosure-restricting provision of the first sentence of subsection (e). What if the use decided upon by the attorney general involves disclosure to non-state employees? But this tension exists no matter how "employee of the state" is defined. Similar tension existed in the 1976 version of the federal act. Under 15 U.S.C. ยง 1313(d) an attorney designated to appear in any case or proceeding could use CID material "in connection with any such case . . . or proceeding as such attorney determines to be required." This language is not greatly different from the discretionary authority granted in the fourth sentence of subsection (e) ("use . . . as the . . . designee considers necessary in the enforcement of this chapter"). But the presence of this provision did not prevent the federal courts from giving a literal interpretation to "authorized . . . employee" in subsection (c)(3).
It would be presumptuous in this dissent to try to work out all the possible ramifications of the interplay between the provisions of the first and last sentences of subsection .592(e). But I believe that one key to understanding how they interact is found in the fact that the final sentence relates to enforcement. The 1975 act is divided into four articles: "Article 1. Substantive Provisions," "Article 2. Enforcement Provisions," Article 3. Investigatory Powers," and "Article 4. General Provisions." The final sentence of subsection .592(e) is limited to uses for "enforcement." Thus it may not apply, given the structure of the act, to investigative proceedings conducted under the third article of the act. Under this construction there is no necessary conflict between the use clause of the final sentence of subsection (e) and interpreting "authorized employee" in the disclosure restricting clause of the first sentence to refer only to actual state employees. Disclosure outside the circle of authorized state employees is authorized under the use clause if a case reaches the enforcement stage, but not until then.
In summary, I believe that "employee of the state" in AS 45.50.592(e) should be construed to communicate the meaning that the term "employee of the state" would convey in ordinary and common usage. As so construed, subsection .592(e) would bar the disclosure without court approval of CID documents to a law firm with a contract with the state. For these reasons I would reverse the decision of the superior court and remand this case for a hearing to determine whether there is good cause to disclose Tesoro's records to the law firm retained by the state in this case.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Alaska Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|