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Tesoro Petroleum Corporation v. State2/15/2002
ion of how documents regarding all types of petroleum products relate to the investigation, and the deference due such explanations, the superior court's holding is not clearly erroneous. The superior court demonstrated a rational foundation for its holding: "The definition for 'petroleum products' shall remain intact as it is not an unreasonable request in order for the Attorney General to better understand how the movement of certain products within the market affects pricing of gasoline products."
In support of its request to limit the CID to gasoline-related documents, Tesoro cites Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., a case in which one petroleum company alleged antitrust violations by another, relating to the price of gasoline. After the defendant company served a subpoena duces tecum on a non-party witness, the district court modified the subpoena to cover only gasoline products. Tesoro argues that here a similar modification should have been ordered in accordance with its requests for relief.
We agree with the State that the holding in Covey Oil is inapt. Covey Oil dealt with a private antitrust action; in contrast to an agency investigation, the private petitioner's request did not warrant deference. Moreover, the opinion does not clearly indicate the scope of the products at issue in the case. The trial court's modifications to the subpoena did not necessarily have anything to do with the range of petroleum products included in the subpoena. That Tesoro was able to find a case discussing a subpoena which covered only gasoline does not persuade us that a similar subpoena is appropriate here, particularly where the burden of proof rests with Tesoro. We therefore affirm the superior court's holding that Tesoro must produce documents relating to "petroleum products" as originally defined in the CID.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Hosie, as outside counsel to the State, should be considered "an authorized employee of the state" for purposes of AS 45.50.592(e), because the superior court reviewed the CID under the correct standard, and because the superior court was within its discretion in holding that the CID was not unreasonable, improper, or oppressive, we AFFIRM the superior court's decision in all respects. MATTHEWS, Justice, dissenting.
Is the law firm retained by the state an "employee of the state" under AS 45.50.592(e)? I answer "no" because ordinary usage controls the meaning of undefined statutory terms, "employee" in ordinary usage means a natural person employed for a wage or salary, and the firm meets neither of these elements. Further, this conclusion is consistent with cases interpreting a similar federal statute, better protects the intended confidentiality of CID material, and is not inconsistent with other terms of the statute.
Alaska Statute 45.50.592(e) prohibits the disclosure of documentary material produced pursuant to an investigatory demand to "anyone other than an authorized employee of the state" unless the person who produced the documents consents or unless the superior court "for good cause shown" permits disclosure. In determining what a statute means, "unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." The ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the term "employee of the state" "means a person employed by the state who is paid a wage or salary but does not include a person hired by the state to work as an independent contractor . . . ." As today's opinion acknowledges, the term "employee" "is typically mutually exclusive of the term 'independent contractor.'" "Employee" is synonymous with "servant" and is often used in contradistinction to
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