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Thompson v. Stansberry6/21/2002
Lawrence Edward Thompson (Appellant), an inmate confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID), filed suit complaining of cross-gender strip searches. He appeals from the trial court's order granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Cheryl Stansberry, Charles Williamson, and Gary Johnson (collectively Appellees) and dismissing Appellant's cause of action with prejudice. In two issues, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment and erred in granting Appellees more relief than requested. We modify the trial court's judgment to delete unnecessary language and affirm as modified.
Appellant is a male prisoner at the Eastham Unit of TDCJ-ID. Cheryl Stansberry is a correctional officer at the Eastham Unit, Charles Williamson is former assistant warden of the Eastham Unit, and Gary Johnson is former Director of TDCJ-ID. Appellant adheres to the teachings of the Islamic faith. One of the tenets of his faith is that he should not be seen nude by females other than his wife. During his incarceration, Appellant was required to submit to strip searches performed by Stansberry, as well as other female correctional officers, and then required to walk down a hall to the shower while in view of female officers. Appellant made it clear to correctional officers that he was uncomfortable with these practices and eventually filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Texas Tort Claims Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.001 - 101.109 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2002). He argued that, as a Muslim, the prison system's policy allowing cross-gender strip searches violates his right to religious freedom under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. He also asserted a claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act for negligent implementation of policy.
Appellant's petitions caused some confusion as to who was sued and in what capacity. However, a pro se inmate's petition is to be liberally construed. Spellmon v. Sweeney, 819 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, no writ). With that directive in mind, we consider the state of the record. In the style of his original petition, Appellant named Stansberry and Williamson, in their individual capacity, and TDCJ- ID. He did not name TDCJ-ID in the body of his petition. In his first amended petition, Appellant named nine additional defendants, apparently all correctional officers at the Eastham Unit. In his second amended petition, Appellant named two of those nine defendants as if they were being named for the first time, and catalogued new allegations against those defendants and against TDCJ-ID based on the actions of those defendants.
The record does not show that TDCJ-ID or any individual defendants other than Stansberry and Williamson were ever served. Jurisdiction of the person of a defendant is acquired by service of process, by his voluntary appearance, or by his waiver of service. Stanley v. Columbus State Bank, 258 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Accordingly, judgment shall not be rendered against one who was not served and did not waive service or appear. Tex. R. Civ. P. 124. Appellant filed his Second Amended Petition, his live pleading, on March 1, 2000. Appellees, Stansberry, Williamson, and Johnson, thereafter filed an Original Answer, an amended answer and jury demand, a motion for summary judgment, and an amended motion for summary judgment. Appellees therefore appeared before the trial court for all purposes. Appellant claims he did not sue Johnson, individually or in his official capacity. However, as Johnson appeared, he voluntarily subjected himself to the jurisdiction of t
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