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Texas Workers Compensation Insurance Facility v. Leon6/27/2002
Texas Workers Compensation Insurance Facility appeals from a jury verdict that found Serafin de Leon's 1993 compensable injury resulted in total and permanent loss of both of his feet. Based upon the jury's verdict, the trial court entered judgment that de Leon was entitled to lifetime income benefits (LIBS). In seven issues, appellant contends the trial court erred in rendering judgment based on a finding of total and permanent "loss of both feet"; that the pleadings do not support the judgment; that the court erred in not tracking the statutory language when submitting the jury question; that the evidence was factually and legally insufficient to prove that de Leon sustained a total and permanent loss of use of both feet; that the court abused its discretion in not allowing appellant's evidence of "loss of both feet at or above the ankle"; and that the judgment does not specify the amount, timing and frequency of the payments to be made to de Leon.
In 1993, Serafin de Leon suffered a compensable injury to his feet when he fell off a roof while employed as a roofer. At the hearing before the Texas Worker's Compensation Hearings Division, the hearing officer was asked to decide if appellee was entitled to receive lifetime income benefits based on the total and permanent loss of use of both feet. After reviewing the evidence, the hearing officer concluded that the claimant was not entitled to lifetime benefits based on the total and permanent loss of both feet. De Leon appealed to the Texas Worker's Compensation Commission Appeals Panel. After summarizing the medical evidence, the appeals panel stated that the " ssue in this case is the claimant's entitlement to LIBS [Lifetime Income Benefits]. Section 408.161(a)(2) provides that LIBS are paid until the death of the employee for the loss of both feet at or above the ankle. Section 408.161(b) provides that the loss of use of a body part is the loss of that body part for purposes of Subsection (a)." Conceding that the evidence was conflicting and could support inferences different from those found most reasonable by the hearing officer, the appeals panel found no basis for disturbing the hearing officer's decision and affirmed his order. De Leon then sought judicial review of his claim.
In its sixth issue, appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing it to present evidence that de Leon did not suffer a loss of both feet at or above the ankle. We review decisions on the admissibility of evidence by the abuse of discretion standard. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. 2000). A trial court abuses its discretion only if it acts unreasonably or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operations, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). We may reverse a trial court's judgment based on an error in the exclusion of evidence only if we conclude that (1) the trial court did in fact commit error and (2) the error was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper judgment. Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. 1989).
Immediately before jury selection, the court sustained de Leon's limine motion, in which de Leon sought to preclude appellant from presenting any evidence on claims or defenses that were not raised during the contested case hearing before the Texas Worker's Compensation Commission. De Leon argued, as he does here, that appellant did not raise at the administrative hearing the defense that de Leon could not recover because the loss to his feet was not at or above the ankle. Appellant did not dispute that it had not raised that defense, but argued that the hearing officer and appea
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