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McCraw v. Mary Black Hospital6/17/2002
ler v. National Health Care Ctr. of Sumter, 334 S.C. at 338, 513 S.E.2d at 845 (substantial evidence is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached).
Furthermore, we agree with the Court of Appeals that, based on the evidence in the record, the earliest possible date of definitive diagnosis occurred when McCraw was hospitalized on November 19, 1992; therefore, McCraw's November 14, 1994 filing for benefits was timely pursuant to § 42-15-40.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals went on to discuss whether disability is required to trigger the statute of limitations. During this discussion, the Court of Appeals analyzed both workers' compensation statutes and applicable case law. McCraw, 338 S.C. at 485-88, 527 S.E.2d at 117-18. Petitioners maintain the Court of Appeals erred in holding that disability is a requirement of the statute of limitations.
The Court of Appeals' analysis of this issue was unnecessary given its dispositive holding that definitive diagnosis did not occur until November 19, 1992, at the earliest. In light of our decision affirming this holding, we decline to address petitioners' argument and vacate that portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion addressing this issue.
2. Notice
The Court of Appeals held petitioners failed to appeal the Commissioner's finding that McCraw gave timely notice of her claim to the Hospital, and therefore, it is the law of the case. Petitioners argue this was error. We agree.
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-20 (1985), notice to the employer must be given within 90 days after the occurrence of the accident upon which the employee is basing her claim. The Commissioner found that McCraw provided timely notice to the Hospital via a long term disability form filed on or about January 12, 1993. In their appeal to the Commission, petitioners alleged the Commissioner erred in finding that McCraw's claim was timely reported pursuant to section 42-15-20. The Commission, however, did not reach this claim because its decision rested solely on the statute of limitations issue. When McCraw appealed to the circuit court and when petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, petitioners continued to assert the notice issue. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in finding petitioners had not appealed this issue.
In addition, petitioners continue to assert that McCraw knew she had an occupational disease in 1991, and therefore, she failed to give timely notice. However, as noted by the Court of Appeals, the record simply does not support a date for triggering notice earlier than November 19, 1992. Because McCraw filed the long term disability form in January 1993, there appears to be no merit to petitioners' argument. Nonetheless, we find that this issue has yet to be addressed by the Commission, and therefore it is remanded, along with the other issues raised by petitioners but not yet considered by the Commission. See Fox v. Newberry County Mem'l Hosp., 319 S.C. 278, 280, 461 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1995) ("The duty to determine facts is placed solely on the Commission and the court reviewing the decision of the Commission has no authority to determine factual issues but must remand the matter to the Commission for further proceedings."); Ross v. American Red Cross, 298 S.C. 490, 492, 381 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1989) ("the Full Commission, as the ultimate fact-finder, may make its own findings, adverse to those of the Single Commissioner").
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals' decision that the statute of limitations does not bar McCraw's claim because definitive diagnosis occurred, at the earli
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