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Wilkins v. Atlantic Richfield Co.6/21/2002
isease due to chemical exposure, and that the limitation periods under § 43(A) did not bar his claim because the first distinct manifestation of the disease was in approximately May or June, 1995. Claimant recognizes § 43(A) only provides for application of a first manifestation test in cases of asbestosis, silicosis or exposure to nuclear radiation, but contends that provision violates Article 5, § 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution as a special law disfavoring those who suffer from occupational diseases other than the three statutorily specified.
The true nature of Claimant's contention is reflected in his assertion this "disparate application of" § 43(A) is violative of the equal protection clause of the constitutions of Oklahoma and the United States. The Oklahoma Supreme Court considered a similar question in McDonald v. Time-DC, Inc., 1989 OK 76, 773 P.2d 1252. The McDonald claimant argued the statute of limitations on his single-event injury did not begin to run until he "discovered" the full extent of his injury. The Supreme Court held the language of § 43 "militates against a construction that would allow engrafting a tort-like discovery rule" and went on to state:
... Only for asbestosis, silicosis or exposure to nuclear radiation does the limitation period now in effect begin to run from the date of manifestation. 85 O.S. Supp. 1986 § 43(A). The cited enactment's restriction operates as an explicit exception from the general regime for application to some forms of cumulative-effect injuries. The legislative enumeration of compensable harms singled out from others clearly prohibits a judicial extension of similar exceptions both to single-event or to other kinds of cumulative-effect injuries, regardless of apparent hardship or inconvenience. McDonald, 773 P.2d at 1257.
Thus, the McDonald Court expressly found the first manifestation test may only be applied in cases of those specifically enumerated conditions in § 43(A). The Court further held that a division of claimants based on the character of their disease or injuries did not "offend constitutional restrictions on the governmental use of classifications," noting:
Single-event and cumulative-event injuries bear distinctive characteristics which require different treatment. Recognition of these separate classes is necessary for fair application of § 43's one-year (now two-year) limitation. It is hence rationally related to legitimate state interests in orderly adjudication of claims and in judicial economy. There is here no violation of the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause of the 14 th Amendment. McDonald, 773 P.2d at 1257.
The State has the same interests in extending the limitation period by application of a first manifestation test in only those certain limited circumstances where -- as contrasted to other injuries and occupational diseases -- the harmful employment related effects are normally imperceptible to the senses, and the injuries are at first asymptomatic with latency periods of many years before becoming manifest. The limitations in § 43(A) allow no-fault compensation for loss of employees' earning power while imposing reasonable time limits on employers' liability particularized to the characteristics of each type of injury or disease. We find in the foregoing a legitimate state purpose in the § 43(A) classifications which satisfies a rational-basis inquiry. Special Indem. Fund v. Bedford, 1993 OK 60, 852 P.2d 150.
Claimant having conceded the evidence supports the Workers' Compensation Court's findings, and Claimant having failed to established the order on review is contrary to law, that order is SUSTAINED.
MITCHELL, J., conc
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