Martinez v. Northern Rio Arriba Electric Cooperative6/12/2002
fore, we do not consider constructive fraud a viable theory to justify any such award.
Punitive Damages
During its deliberation, the jury submitted a question to the court asking whether, instead of placing a dollar value on punitive damages, the jury could just state "lawyers fees, court and medical costs." The trial court, with the approval of counsel for both parties, provided no answer to the jury's question. On the verdict form, instead of entering a dollar amount for punitive damages, the jury wrote, " ll court costs and lawyer fees acquired over the last 6 years related to this case." When the jury returned its verdict, neither party objected to the manner in which the jury purported to award punitive damages, and the jury was discharged.
Martinez relies on Thompson Drilling, Inc. v. Romig, 105 N.M. 701, 703, 736 P.2d 979, 981 (1987), for the proposition that the jury's verdict was proper, even if the jury did not enter a dollar amount. In Thompson, our Supreme Court upheld an award of monetary damages that included the words "+ Gross Receipt Tax." Id. at 702, 736 P.2d at 980. The applicable gross receipts tax was apparent from a bill that had been introduced into evidence. Id. at 703, 736 P.2d at 981. Similarly, Martinez argues that the trial court applied a "mere mathematical calculation" to give effect to the jury's intent. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We disagree. The amount of tax at issue in Thompson was easily discernible by reference to the record. In the present case, however, the jury had no such evidence of legal fees and costs incurred by Martinez. The jury had no idea, at least no idea based upon the evidence presented at trial, of the amount of punitive damages they might be awarding. Cf. id.
The general rule is that " valid judgment cannot be entered on a jury verdict which is neither specific nor definite as to the damages awarded." Sanchez v. Martinez, 99 N.M. 66, 71, 653 P.2d 897, 902 (Ct. App. 1982). The verdict should leave no question as to the clear intent of the jury to award a specific amount. Id. at 72, 653 P.2d at 903. "Defects in a verdict which render it indefinite or insufficient invalidate the verdict form unless corrected by the jury following further deliberations." Id.
In this case, Martinez accepted a verdict that was a legal nullity. See Thompson Drilling, Inc., 105 N.M. at 703, 736 P.2d at 981 (stating that the right to object to an improper verdict is waived when not made at the return of the verdict and cannot be reclaimed by resorting to a motion for a new trial or on appeal); Ettenson v. Burke, 2001-NMCA-003, 28, 130 N.M. 67, 17 P.3d 440 (reversing a portion of the verdict, which was a legal nullity because it was rendered without the necessary legal foundation); see also Bldg. Structures, Inc. v. Young, 968 P.2d 1287, 1291-92 (Or. 1998) (holding that plaintiff's failure to make such a request, while the jury was still empaneled, waived the insufficiency or irregularity of the verdict and precluded the granting of a new trial); Langton v. Int'l Transp., Inc., 491 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Utah 1971) (same). Accordingly, the trial court erred when it entered judgment on the award of punitive damages, and that portion of the judgment must be reversed.
NORA's Request for a New Trial
NORA argues that, if any of Martinez's liability claims survive this appeal, NORA is entitled to a new trial due to the admission of prejudicial evidence related to any claims that we are now determining should not have been submitted to the jury. For example, NORA argues that the evidence admitted to prove Martinez's claim of emotional distress could have play
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