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Maltese v. Township of North Brunswick6/20/2002
r the services have been rendered to the municipality. N.J.S.A. 40A:5-17a requires that " he governing body shall approve or disapprove all claims." A municipality is authorized to adopt an ordinance that establishes the precise procedures for certifying and approving claims for payment. See N.J.S.A. 40A:5-17a(1) to -17a(4).
As to salaries, compensation and other benefits, N.J.S.A. 40A:5-19 provides, as follows:
The governing body of any local unit may provide by ordinance for the manner in which and the time at which salaries, wages or other compensation for services shall be paid, and prescribe the form and manner in which checks upon the treasury shall be drawn and signed for that purpose.
The local unit may, by resolution, provide for the bi-weekly payment of the salaries, wages and compensation of officers and employees, both elective and appointive.
The record does not contain copies of any ordinances adopted by the Township respecting the process for review, certification and approval of claims for payment, nor does it contain the precise resolutions reflecting authorization for any payments made to plaintiff for the buy-back of sick days, reimbursement for tuition, books or other education-related expenses, longevity payments, or any other items that plaintiff contends he was compensated for in accordance with the terms of the SOA collective bargaining agreement.
It is clear that the mayor's representations to plaintiff concerning the applicability of the provisions of the SOA collective bargaining agreement to plaintiff's employment as Public Safety Director were ultra vires and, without more, are not binding upon the Township. The statutory procedures were simply not followed. Only action by the council could afford plaintiff the benefits and compensation set forth in the SOA collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise, the manner and amount of compensation for the positions accepted by plaintiff were clearly "legislated" by the council in the existing salary ordinance.
II.
We now turn to the issue of whether the Township can be equitably estopped from denying plaintiff the benefits under the SOA collective bargaining agreement. A closely-related issue is whether he may receive those benefits by application of the equitable doctrine of ratification.
Principles applicable to the doctrine of equitable estoppel were outlined by our Supreme Court in Summer Cottagers' Ass'n of Cape May v. City of Cape May, 19 N.J. 493, 503-04 (1955), and warrant quoting here at length:
The essential principle of the policy of estoppel here invoked is that one may, by voluntary conduct, be precluded from taking a course of action that would work injustice and wrong to one who with good reason and in good faith has relied upon such conduct. . . . An estoppel by matter in pais may arise by silence or omission where one is under a duty to speak or act. . . . It has to do with the inducement of conduct to action or non-action. One's act or acceptance may close his mouth to allege or prove the truth. . . . The doing or forbearing to do an act induced by the conduct of another may work an estoppel to avoid wrong or injury ensuing from reasonable reliance upon such conduct. The repudiation of one's act done or position assumed is not permissible where that course would work injustice to another who, having the right to do so, has relied thereon. . . . An estoppel arises "where a man is concluded and forbidden by law to speak against his own act or deed; yea, even though it is to say the truth." Termes de la Ley, title Estoppel.
There is a distinction between an act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a
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