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Maltese v. Township of North Brunswick6/20/2002
because the contract not only was offered to him and he accepted it, but it was being carried out during the course of his five and a half years as . . . Police Director.
. . . . So there is no factual argument to be had that his reliance wasn't reasonable. Because I reject the . . . argument, I will grant summary judgment in favor of [plaintiff] in that event.
On appeal, the Township presents the following arguments for our consideration:
POINT I BY LAW, THE FORMER MAYOR LACKED THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE THE ORAL AGREEMENT PLAINTIFF SEEKS TO ENFORCE. SINCE THAT AGREEMENT WAS ULTRA VIRES AND IS THEREFORE VOID, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. POINT II EVEN IF ESTOPPEL WERE AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFF, THE EVIDENCE IS UNDISPUTED THAT HE CANNOT SATISFY THE ELEMENTS OF ESTOPPEL, PARTICULARLY THE ELEMENT OF REASONABLE RELIANCE. ACCORDINGLY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF AND DENYING THE TOWNSHIP'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
I.
The Township argues that the agreement between plaintiff and the mayor was ultra vires, and therefore void and unenforceable. As a result, the Township contends the doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapplicable. Moreover, the Township asserts that even if applicable, plaintiff has failed to establish the requisite elements for invoking equitable estoppel against the Township.
Resolution of the issues posed by this appeal requires our consideration of interwoven principles involving, (1) ultra vires actions by municipal officials, (2) equitable estoppel and (3) ratification. However, "in deciding whether or not to invoke equitable estoppel against a municipality, a court must focus on the nature of the action taken by the municipality[.]" Wood v. Borough of Wildwood Crest, 319 N.J. Super. 650, 656 (App. Div. 1999).
The Township of North Brunswick is a municipality governed by a form of government authorized under the "Faulkner Act," or "Optional Municipal Charter Law," N.J.S.A. 40:69A-1 to -210 (the Act), an elective statutory scheme that permits participating municipalities to choose between four plans of government that are delineated in the Act. See McGann v. Clerk of City of Jersey City, 167 N.J. 311, 324 (2001). Here, the Township elected to be governed by the Mayor-Council-Administrator Plan of government, as set forth in Article 16A of the Act, N.J.S.A. 40:69A-149.1 to -149.16.
In addition to the provisions set forth in Article 16A, Article 2 of the Act, N.J.S.A. 40:69A-26 to -30, and Article 17 thereof, N.J.S.A. 40:69A-150 to -210, "contain a series of mandatory provisions that are common to all of the optional plans[.]" Ibid. Thus, upon the adoption of an optional form of government under the Faulkner Act, "the municipality shall thereafter be governed by the plan adopted, by the provisions of this act common to optional plans and by all applicable provisions of general law[.]" N.J.S.A. 40:69A-26.
It is also clear that "'the Faulkner Act plainly envisages some separation of functions between the Council (the legislative body) and the Mayor (the executive).'" Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333, 343 (1999) (quoting In re Shain, 92 N.J. 524, 537 (1983)). Moreover, " hat separation of functions imposes 'certain limits on the Mayor and local Council in governing the municipality.'" Ibid. (quoting Shain, supra, 92 N.J. at 538). As the Court noted, " rinciples of separation of powers are applicable where the Legislature has specifically delegated to the mayor and to the council separate functions in the appointment of officials[.] . . . Where one branch of government has been specifically v
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