Joint Petition of Boardwalk Regency Corporation v. New Jersey Casino Control Commission6/21/2002
he rules of the commission, a record of each written or unwritten agreement regarding the realty, construction, maintenance, or business of a proposed or existing casino hotel or related facility. The foregoing obligation shall apply regardless of whether the casino applicant or licensee is a party to the agreement. Any such agreement may be reviewed by the commission on the basis of the reasonableness of its terms, including the terms of compensation, and of the qualifications of the owners, officers, employees, and directors of any enterprise involved in the agreement, which qualifications shall be reviewed according to the standards enumerated in section 86 of this act. If the commission disapproves such an agreement or the owners, officers, employees, or directors of any enterprise involved therein, the commission may require its termination.
In addressing its authority to review the severance agreement, the Commission observed that it "has always interpreted [Section 104b] broadly," in recognition of its statutory mission to "strictly regulate the casino gaming industry in order to preserve and foster public confidence in the integrity of the regulatory process and the casino industry." The Commission submits that the proposed severance agreement "entails the 'business' of the casino licensee[,]" and its "regulatory scrutiny was particularly appropriate" here, given that DiBartolomeo was found unsuitable for licensure.
Administrative agencies have only such powers as are conferred on them by the Legislature. Young v. Western Elec. Co., 96 N.J. 220, 225 (1984) (citations omitted). These powers include those "expressly granted which in turn are attended by those incidental powers which are reasonably necessary or appropriate to effectuate the specific delegation." In re Regulation F-22, Office of Milk Indus., 32 N.J. 258, 261 (1960) (citation omitted). In interpreting a statute, a court's ultimate aim is to discern and apply the intent of the Legislature. State v. Gonzalez, 142 N.J. 618, 627 (1995) (citations omitted). Legislative intent is to be gleaned from the entire statute, to be read so that each provision aligns with the intent of the entire act. Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Medina, 39 N.J. 222, 226-27 (1963) (citations omitted); see also Jimenez v. Baglieri, 152 N.J. 337, 351 (1998) ("The inquiry in the ultimate analysis is to determine the true intention of the law; and, to this end, the particular words are to be made responsive to the essential purpose of the law.") (citation omitted). "The plain language of a statute is paramount in determining its proper meaning and application unless that language is inconsistent with manifest legislative intent or another meaning expressly indicated." Cox v. Cox, 335 N.J. Super. 465, 476-77 (App. Div. 2000) (citing Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496, 505-512 (1990)). Moreover, an appellate court will accord substantial deference to an interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with enforcing it. Medical Soc'y of New Jersey v. New Jersey Dep't of Law and Pub. Safety, 120 N.J. 18, 26-27 (1990) (citation omitted); see also In re Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co's. Rate Unbundling, 167 N. J. 377, 384 (2001) (stating the agency's interpretation and implementation of a statute it is responsible for enforcing and its interpretation of its own regulations are entitled to great weight) (citations omitted). Thus, an agency's interpretation will prevail "so long as it is not plainly unreasonable." Metromedia, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313, 327 (1984) (citations omitted).
With these principles in mind, we turn to whether the Commission has the authority to review, and ultimately invalidate, all or a portion of the severance agreement.
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