Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of the Superior Court of New Jersey5/31/2002
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Our courts have found a broad array of medical conditions to be handicaps under the LAD, including obesity, Viscik, supra, N.J. ; alcoholism, Clowes v. Terminix Intern Inc., 109 N.J. 575 (1989); epilepsy, Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets Inc., 110 N.J. 363, 365 (1988); and drug addiction, In re Cahill, 245 N.J. Super. 397 (App. Div. 1991). By defining handicap broadly, the Legislature intends to focus scrutiny not on whether a particular employee's limitations qualify for protection, but on the work-site actions taken in light of whatever physical or mental limitations the worker presents. Thus, the LAD seeks to ensure that distinctions between people are "made on the basis of merit, rather than skin color, age, sex or gender, or any other measure that obscures a person's individual humanity and worth." Enriquez v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 342 N.J. Super. 501, 527 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 211 (2001).
According to Tynan's physicians, she suffered from post- traumatic stress disorder, depression, irritable bowel syndrome, migraine headaches, hypertension, reflux esophagitis, and anxiety panic attacks. The migraine headaches, irritable bowel syndrome, reflux and hypertension are physical problems, while the post traumatic stress disorder, depression and panic attacks are psychological. Plaintiff thus claims to suffer from a combination of physical and psychological maladies, most associated with stress.
The trial judge commented that there "may be a question of fact as to whether Miss Tynan is disabled . . . but we will accept that. We will give her all favorable inferences with regard to that." We agree with the trial judge's assessment and conclude that Tynan has at least set forth sufficient illnesses and psychological maladies to withstand summary judgment.
Regardless of Tynan's handicap under the LAD, however, the vicinage argues that Tynan never specifically requested an accommodation to perform her job. According to the vicinage, Tynan never requested an accommodation for stress and it has no record of any formal written request for a reasonable accommodation of her handicap. The only requests she made were to report to a different supervisor and to have her personnel records purged of the alleged erroneous warnings.
The vicinage thus argues that before it must provide any accommodation, the disabled employee must make a specific request advising the vicinage precisely what accommodation the employee seeks. We agree that under the law an employee must request an accommodation, but we disagree with the vicinage that the request must be as formal or specific as the vicinage appears to suggest.
Plaintiff informed the vicinage on more than one occasion that she was having problems and the accommodation she was seeking. The fact that the vicinage, perhaps rightly, rejected the specific requests that Tynan initially made to have her personnel file purged and not report to Pardo, does not excuse the vicinage from further action.
It is not necessary that requests for reasonable accommodations be in writing or even use the phrase "reasonable accommodation." Taylor v. Phoenixville School District, 184 F.3d 296, 313 (1999) (quoting EEOC manual). " n employer cannot expect an employee to read its mind and know that he or she must specifically say 'I want reasonable accommodation.'" Ibid. (quoting Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 100 F.3d 1281, 1286 (7th Cir. 1996). An employee may use plain English and need not mention the ADA or any other legal source requiring accommodation. Taylor, supra, 184 F.3d at 313. While there are no magic words to seek an accommodation, the employee, however, "must make clear that . . . assis
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