Baker v. National State Bank6/21/2002
tiff was entitled to all "remedies available in common law tort actions," which would include punitive damages. Thus, the Bank was definitely on notice that it could be liable for punitive damages. Whether the Bank was on notice that it could be liable for either $4 million or $1.8 million in punitive damages requires an examination of decided cases.
The Bank cites to three cases decided prior to 1991, arguing that none of those cases gave it fair notice of a $1.8 million punitive award. In Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539, 549 (1990), the jury awarded the plaintiff $250,000 in compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive damages, a ratio of three to one. That award was reversed because the Court found that the plaintiff had failed to meet his prima facie burden of reverse sex discrimination, and a new trial was ordered. Id. at 554-55. The disposition of the case after that order is not known. In Milazzo v. Exxon Corp., 243 N.J. Super. 573, 574 (Law Div. 1990), the plaintiff was awarded $100,000 in punitive and $276,144 in compensatory damages, a ratio of .36 to 1. In Levinson, supra, 868 F.2d at 559-601, the plaintiff received $2.3 million in punitive and $257,184 in compensatory damages, a ratio of 8.9 to 1. After a new trial on punitive damages was held, in 1990, the plaintiff received $1 million, reducing the ratio to 3.8 to 1. Lastly, in a case not cited, Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 223 N.J. Super. 467, 473 (App. Div. 1988), the jury awarded the plaintiff $1,000,000 in punitive and $600,000 in compensatory damages, a ratio of 1.6 to 1. On appeal, this court ordered a new trial and therefore, it is unknown whether the damages and ratio remained the same.
Even though in three of the cases just discussed, a new trial was ordered, thus rendering the amount of the punitive damages award in doubt in 1991, that is not to say those cases could not provide adequate notice. The cases indicated to the Bank that it could be liable for punitive damages in the neighborhood of a million dollars and at a multiple of close to four times compensatory damages. Thus, the case law provided the Bank with sufficient notice of the remitted punitive damages award of $1.8 million, which was six times compensatory damages.
It is more difficult to conclude that the Bank had notice of the unremitted award of $4 million, which was fourteen times compensatory damages, since none of the cited cases, after appeal, awarded punitive damages in the multi-million dollar range or in that ratio range.
We disagree with plaintiffs' inclusion of Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 291 N.J. Super. 98 (App. Div. 1996), aff'd 153 N.J. 163 (1998) as providing notice because that case occurred after 1991, and therefore cannot be construed as relevant for purposes of notice.
Because we have concluded that the Bank had fair notice only of the remitted award, it is unnecessary to address in detail plaintiffs' argument that federal sentencing guidelines gave the Bank notice of the unremitted award. We, however, note that the guidelines were promulgated to provide federal courts assistance in sentencing criminal defendants, and are of dubious applicability to this civil setting.
The Bank's citations to numerous employment discrimination cases decided outside this State and the ratios discussed within are of little value. Punitive damages awards are exceptionally fact-specific, dependent on the conduct involved and even more importantly, the wealth of the defendant. See Herman v. Sunshine Chem. Specialties, Inc., 133 N.J. 329, 339 (1993) (stating that defendant's financial condition is relevant factor in all punitive damages awards because degree of punishment must be pr
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 New Jersey Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|