Baker v. National State Bank6/21/2002
to make up for some loss that was not, originally, a money loss but one that ordinarily may be measured in money." Dan B. Dobbs, Remedies, "Principle of Damages," ยง 3.1 at 135 (3d ed. 1973). In an employment discrimination case, such damages include back pay, provided "to make the discriminatee whole by reimbursement of the economic loss suffered," and front pay, provided to compensate the employee for future lost wages attributable to the employer's misconduct. Goodman, supra, 86 N.J. at 34-35; Levinson v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 868 F.2d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 1989); Cavuoti v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 161 N.J. 107, 135 (1999). In discussing the amount of compensatory damages awarded in this case, the Supreme Court specifically included the back and front pay amounts; the Court noted that Baker was awarded "a total of $135,740 in compensatory damages" and "Hausleiter a total of $102,241 in compensatory damages." Baker, supra, 161 N.J. at 225; see also Cavuoti, supra, 161 N.J. at 115 (stating that jury awarded plaintiff $222,323 in compensatory damages, or $177,323 in lost wages and $45,000 for emotional distress). Thus, there is no need to discuss in detail the cases cited by the Bank to support its argument that compensatory damages are limited to pain and suffering. Those cases do exclude back and front pay from the definition of compensatory damages, but are of little persuasive authority, given the clear position on compensatory damages in this State.
Addressing plaintiffs' arguments, they first argue that prejudgment interest must be included in the compensatory damages figure. We agree, because by court rule and case law, prejudgment interest in tort actions is required to fully compensate the plaintiff.
Rule 4:42-11(b) requires a court to award prejudgment interest in all tort actions. Prejudgment interest is mandated because its purpose "is compensatory, to indemnify the claimant for the loss of what the moneys due him would presumably have earned if payment had not been delayed." Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 358, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1106, 94 S. Ct. 831, 38 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1973); see also Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 558, 108 S. Ct. 1965, 1971, 100 L. Ed. 2d 549, 559 (1988) (stating that prejudgment interest "of course, is an 'element of complete compensation'"). It has also been held that R. 4:42-(11)(b) applies to damages awarded pursuant to LAD. Milazzo v. Exxon Corp., 243 N.J. Super. 573, 576 (Law Div. 1990). There, the court reasoned that since N.J.S.A. 10:5-13 specifically was amended to provide a LAD plaintiff with " ll remedies available in common law tort actions," it was clear that the Legislature intended R. 4:42(11)(b) to apply to LAD. Ibid.; accord Gallo v. Salesian Soc'y Inc., 290 N.J. Super. 616, 661 (App. Div. 1996).
Since the motivating purpose behind the ratio is to ensure that the relationship between the punitive damages awarded and the actual damages suffered is reasonable, it is appropriate for the actual or compensatory damages figure to include all monies awarded to fully compensate the plaintiff, including prejudgment interest.
Plaintiffs next argue that their actual damages were greater than the award indicates because the trial court erroneously accepted defendant's definition of front pay, which was really another back pay award. Plaintiffs assert that the trial court's definition of front pay was erroneous and point to this court's opinion in this case, which noted that the trial court "accepted defendants' erroneous definition of 'front pay'." Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, No. A- 488-96T5 at 39 (App. Div. June 2, 1998) (Emphasis added). The trial court's formulation of front pay was incorrect; the court defined that period to ru
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