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Baker v. National State Bank6/21/2002
e is no indication that the payment of postjudgment interest will make the Bank insolvent. The Bank does not even make that argument. Second, Lemaire dealt with the propriety of a garnishment of a bank's assets, and whether such an execution should be stayed pending the bank's appeal of an adverse judgment. That is a very different proposition from whether a bank can be liable for postjudgment interest running during the pendency of the appeal period.
The Bank's second argument focuses on the court's September 13, 1996 stay of judgment. Because the court provided that the stay would remain in effect "during the pendency of all appeals in this matter," the Bank argues that the order of judgment was not in effect until all appeals had ended, which at the very earliest was March 15, 2000. Consequently, the Bank maintains that because New Jersey suspends the running of interest during the time that a stay is in effect, interest did not begin to run until the date the stay ended, March 15, 2000.
Interest is not suspended during a stay of judgment. The cases cited by the Bank deal with prejudgment and not postjudgment interest. See Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Plasti-Clip Corp., 933 F. Supp. 107, 119-20 (D.N.H. 1995) (reducing prejudgment interest because of plaintiff's undue delay in prosecuting case), rev'd on other grounds, 135 F.3d 778 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Prof'l Ins. Mgmt. v. Ohio Cas. Group of Ins. Cos., 246 B.R. 47, 68-70 (D.N.J. 2000) (affirming bankruptcy court's decision not to suspend prejudgment interest during period of "judicial stay or delay"), order vacated, 285 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2002).
This distinction is significant because prejudgment interest differs from postjudgment interest in the stay context. Rule 4:42-11(b) allows a trial court, "in exceptional cases," to suspend the running of prejudgment interest in tort actions. Thus, where postjudgment interest is awarded almost automatically, "as a matter of long-standing practice" in all money judgments, a trial court possesses more discretion in deciding whether or not to stay an award of prejudgment interest. See Mehta v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 163 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 1978) (stating that court may suspend interest in cases where award would not constitute fair compensation to plaintiff for money withheld).
Even in the prejudgment interest context, a court may suspend interest during the pendency of a stay only in "exceptional cases," and in the interests of fairness. Here, the Bank has failed to show that it is an exceptional case and that it would be unfair to provide plaintiffs with interest accruing from the date of the jury verdict. Since both the Supreme Court and this court have concluded that plaintiffs are entitled to an award of punitive damages, it is entirely equitable to provide plaintiffs with interest on that award, running from the date the jury first determined they were entitled to such damages. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835-36, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1575-76, 108 L. Ed. 2d 842, 852 (1990) (stating that postjudgment interest compensates "'the successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for the loss from the time between the ascertainment of the damage and the payment by the defendant'") (citation omitted); see also Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1339 (11th Cir.) (holding that postjudgment interest on remitted punitive damages award ran from date of entry of initial judgment because that was date damages were sufficiently ascertained), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931, 120 S. Ct. 329, 145 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1999).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiffs postjudgment interest on their punitive damage
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