 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Baker v. National State Bank6/21/2002
n prepared to provide information on its value at trial. In May 1996, one month before trial, the Bank successfully moved to strike plaintiffs' discovery request for valuation information. While the Bank argues that the court order precluding discovery of valuation demonstrates an absence of stonewalling, it also evidences the Bank's clear notice that punitive damages would be at issue at trial, and that evidence of the Bank's value was necessary. After the jury determined punitive damages could be awarded, the Bank then made the strategic decision to decline to produce a valuation figure, and instead stipulated to a number.
In that context, we fail to see where the trial court engaged in an error of constitutional dimension by refusing to consider the Bank's value at the time of the wrongdoing. Indeed, because due process essentially involves considerations of fairness, see BMW, supra, 517 U.S. at 574, 116 S. Ct. at 1598, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 826 (stating that " lementary notions of fairness" are enshrined "in our constitutional jurisprudence"), there is no unfairness in holding the Bank to a valuation figure to which it voluntarily agreed. See Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 965 P.2d 440, 454 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that defendant's decision to stipulate to its value did not preclude it from challenging amount of punitive award but "any detriment to defendant in assessing that award -- either by the jury or the reviewing court -- is a consequence of defendant's own making"), rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 473 (2001).
The trial court did not err in concluding that the jury verdict on punitive damages was so tainted as to require a new trial.
IV.
The Bank argues that the trial court erred in ordering postjudgment interest on the punitive damages to run from the date of verdict, July 3, 1996. At the very least, the Bank contends that interest should not have run until July 26, 1996, the date the trial court entered the order of judgment, incorporating the jury verdict. The Bank further asserts that postjudgment interest should not have begun to run until all appeals in the matter had ended. That date was March 15, 2000, the date the Supreme Court denied the Bank's motion for reconsideration. Specifically, the Bank asserts that 12 U.S.C.A. ยง 91, and the stay of judgment entered by the court on September 13, 1996, both precluded the calculation of interest until March 15, 2000. We disagree.
Rule 4:42-11(a) provides for postjudgment interest as follows: "Except as otherwise ordered by the court or provided by law, judgments, awards and orders for the payment of money, taxed costs and counsel fees shall bear simple interest...." Although the rule indicates that interest normally shall run from the date of judgment, it also provides a trial court with the discretion to vary the award, in the interests of equity. See, e.g., Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi, 303 N.J. Super. 239, 264 (App. Div. 1997) (stating that postjudgment interest rate may vary from legal rate when justice and fair dealing require).
Given that the court rule provides a trial court with latitude to deviate from the rule, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering interest to accrue from the date of the jury verdict. See Kim v. Monmouth Coll., 320 N.J. Super. 157, 163 (Law Div. 1998) (ordering postjudgment interest to run from date of verdict). The fairness of the order is further demonstrated by the September 14, 1999 consent order, which made the compensatory damages verdict enforceable and apparently awarded interest from the date of the verdict. Although that order did not specifically state that interest ran from the date of the jury verdict, plaintiffs hav
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 New Jersey Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|