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Motton v. Outsorce International6/11/2002
utory minimum.
We review decisions of the Commission which are clearly interpretations or applications of law for correctness without deference to the Commission's judgment. West v. Posten Const. Co., 804 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Mo. banc 1991); Soos v. Mallinckrodt Chemical Co., 19 S.W.3d 683, 685 (Mo.App. 2000). In workers' compensation cases, we broadly and liberally interpret the law with a view to the public interest and with an understanding that the law is intended to extend its benefits to the largest possible class. West, 804 S.W.2d at 746 (quoting Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Serv., Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo. banc 1983)). Although a liberal construction of the workers' compensation statute in favor of claimants is required, "this principle may not be extended so far as to destroy what we believe to be a 'clearly indicated' intent of the legislature." Staples v. A.P. Green Fire Brick Co., 307 S.W.2d 457, 463 (Mo. banc 1957); see also Simpson v. Dale E. Saunchegrow Const., 965 S.W.2d 899, 905 (Mo.App. 1998). Accordingly, we do not ignore the statute's language to award compensation where the statute does not so provide.
Where one asserts a right under such [worker's compensation] act, he must find his justification therefor in the provisions of such act, based upon the language used, DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co., 327 Mo. 495, 37 S.W.(2d) 640; and provisions not therein found plainly written or necessarily implied from what is written will not be imparted or interpolated therein in order that the existence of such right may be made to appear when otherwise, upon the face of said act, it would not appear. Allen v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 338 Mo. 395, 402, 90 S.W.2d 1050, 1053 (Mo. 1935). "We are not at liberty to write into the Act 'under the guise of construction, provisions which the legislature did not see fit to insert.'" Simpson, 965 S.W.2d at 905 (quoting State ex rel. Mills v. Allen, 344 Mo. 743, 755, 128 S.W.2d 1040, 1046 (Mo. banc 1939)).
Section 287.220 directs when compensation is to be paid from the Second Injury Fund as well as the amounts to be paid from the fund in " ll cases of permanent disability where there has been previous disability." Hughey v. Chrysler Corp., 34 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Mo.App. 2000); section 287.220.1. "'Permanent partial disability' means a disability that is permanent in nature and partial in degree." Section 287.190.6. The portion of section 287.220 that is the subject of this appeal provides:
If any employee who has a pre-existing permanent partial disability whether from compensable injury or otherwise, of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment or to obtaining reemployment if the employee becomes unemployed, and the pre-existing permanent partial disability, if a body as a whole injury, equals a minimum of fifty weeks of compensation or, if a major extremity injury only, equals a minimum of fifteen percent permanent partial disability, according to the medical standards that are used in determining such compensation, receives a subsequent compensable injury resulting in additional permanent partial disability so that the degree or percentage of disability, in an amount equal to a minimum of fifty weeks compensation, if a body as a whole injury or, if a major extremity injury only, equals a minimum of fifteen percent permanent partial disability, caused by the combined disabilities is substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the last injury, considered alone and of itself, and if the employee is entitled to receive compensation on the basis of the combined disabilities, the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the degree or percentage of disab
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