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Phillips v. Mirac6/7/2002
gnitude of the jury's fact-finding province, including its role to determine damages. Respondents are essentially saying that the right to trial by jury is not invaded if the jury is allowed to determine facts which go unheeded when the court issues its judgment. Such an argument pays lip service to the form of the jury but robs the institution of its function. This court will not construe constitutional rights in such a manner. [Emphasis added.]
A similar rationale was adopted by our neighbor state, Ohio, in State ex rel Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v Sheward, 715 NE2d 1062, 1091 (Ohio, 1999), in which the court stated, ". . . a statute that allows the jury to determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded but denies the litigant the benefit of that determination stands on no better constitutional footing than one that precludes the jury from making the determination in the first instance."
While it is true that a trial court may lower a jury's determination of damages under the doctrine of remittitur, this type of diminution, unlike one that occurs as a result of a statutory damages cap, does not render the jury's role illusory. Indeed, in cases of remittitur, a court may lower the jury's determination of damages as a matter of law only after determining that the award is unsupported by the evidence introduced at trial. See Szymanski v Brown, 221 Mich App 423, 431; 562 NW2d 212 (1997). By contrast, a statutory damages cap mandates a reduction solely because of legislative fiat, notwithstanding that a much greater amount of damages may be supported by the evidence introduced at trial. As noted in Sophie, supra at 720-721:
. . . remittitur is wholly within the power of the trial judge. Within the guidelines of the doctrine, the judge makes the legal conclusion that the jury's damage finding is too high. This judicial finding - arrived at with judicial care - is fundamentally different from a legislatively imposed "remittitur" that operates automatically.
The judge's use of remittitur is, in effect, the result of a legal conclusion that the jury's finding of damages is unsupported by the evidence. The Legislature cannot make such case-by-case determinations. Therefore, the legislative damages limit is fundamentally different from the doctrine of remittitur.
In the instant case, the statute at issue required the trial court to arbitrarily reduce the amount of damages awarded by the jury without any determination regarding whether the award was supported by the evidence at trial. The necessary component of judicial discretion was eviscerated, and the constitutional right to trial by jury was violated.
In sum, I conclude that because art 1, ยง 14 of our constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury, and because this right in Michigan includes the right to have the jury determine the amount of damages, see Leary, supra at 578, MCL 257.401(3) must be deemed unconstitutional. I note that in Galayda v Lake Hospital Systems, Inc, 644 NE2d 298, 302 (Ohio, 1994), the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that a statute mandating that any future damages awards in excess of $200,000 be paid in a series of periodic payments violated the constitutional right to trial by jury because it deprived the plaintiff of the full value of the jury's award by reducing the interest available on the award. The court emphasized the following:
It is well established that the right of trial by jury in this state is a fundamental and substantial right guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution.
* * * Included in that right is the right to have a jury determine all questions of fact, including the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitle
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