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Phillips v. Mirac6/7/2002
en put into practice. Rather, the statute is presumed constitutional, and the party challenging it bears a heavy burden of rebutting that presumption. [Crego, supra at 259-260 (citations omitted).]
In the present case, plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. In her brief, plaintiff asserts that the automobile rental lobby essentially duped the Legislature into believing that a problem existed within the industry regarding large jury-determined damages awards in negligence cases and that the industry needed legislative protection in order to ensure the continued operation of these businesses in Michigan, when in fact no problem actually existed. Whether we agree with this assertion is not the issue before us. The "wisdom, need or appropriateness of the legislation" is not for us to decide. Crego, supra at 260. Rather, we must determine only if "any set of facts, either known or which could reasonably be assumed" supports the Legislature's judgment. Crego, supra at 259-260.
We find that this legislation passes that test because it can reasonably be assumed that Michigan has a legitimate interest in the continued operation of automobile rental businesses, and protecting those businesses from large damage awards in jury trials bears a rational relationship to that end. Because subsection 401(3) is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, it survives rational basis review and is constitutional. No violation of the Equal Protection Clause exists here.
C. Due Process
Finally, defendant challenges on appeal the trial court's holding that the damages cap violates the Due Process Clause of the Michigan Constitution, which provides that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Const 1963, art 1, § 17. Because the test to determine whether legislation passes constitutional muster under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is essentially the same, Doe, supra at 682, n 36; Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 612-613; 267 NW2d 72 (1978), subsection 401(3) does not violate due process.
Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Joel P. Hoekstra
Hilda R. Gage
METER, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because I believe the damages cap in MCL 257.401(3) violates the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution. I would affirm the trial court's finding of unconstitutionality.
Our constitution states that " he right of trial by jury shall remain, but shall be waived in all civil cases unless demanded by one of the parties in the manner prescribed by law." Const. 1963, art 1, § 14. The owner's liability statute in particular confers a right to trial by jury, because it provides for actual damages and therefore constituted an action at law at the time the 1963 Constitution was adopted. See Anzaldua v Band, 457 Mich 530, 538-539, 548; 578 NW2d 306 (1998).
In Michigan, the right to a jury trial extends to the determination of damages. See, e.g., Leary v Fisher, 248 Mich 574, 578; 227 NW 767 (1929), Equico Lessor, Inc v Original Buscemi's, Inc, 140 Mich App 532, 536; 364 NW2d 373 (1985), and Waisanen v Gaspardo, 30 Mich App 292, 294; 186 NW2d 75 (1971). In Leary, supra at 576, the plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries sustained when the defendant hit him with an automobile. The Supreme Court stated that "[the p]laintiff is entitled to a right of trial by jury, and one of the necessary incidents of the trial of cases of this character by jury is that the jury shall fix the amount of damages." Id. at 578 (
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