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Phillips v. Mirac6/7/2002
, 270; 533 NW2d 4 (1995). Where the Legislature can abolish a cause of action, it necessarily follows that it can limit the damages recoverable for the cause of action. Kirkland v Blaine Co Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464, 468; 4 P3d 1115 (2000).
Our Legislature has utilized its power to limit or eliminate defendant liability in certain cases. See, e.g., MCL 691.1407 (governmental immunity from tort liability); MCL 418.131 (workers' compensation is exclusive remedy against an employer); MCL 324.73301 (limitation of landowners' liability for injuries to guests to gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct). In addition, through statutes of limitation or repose, our Legislature limits the time in which a plaintiff can bring an action, thereby preventing causes of action that it deems stale. See, e.g., MCL 600.5805 (statute of limitations for injuries to persons or property).
Because our Legislature can change, amend, or repeal the common law or statutory provisions and because that power allows it to limit or completely eliminate actions, we find that it logically follows that the Legislature may limit a plaintiff's remedy. We, like the Supreme Court of Idaho, "can discern no logical reason why a statutory limitation on a plaintiff's remedy is any different than other permissible limitations on the ability of plaintiffs to recover in tort actions." Kirkland, supra at 468.
Nor do we believe that at the time the Constitution of 1963 was adopted, the intent was to prohibit the Legislature from addressing appropriate damages. A number of Michigan statutes at that time provided, and continue to provide, for double or treble damages in civil actions. See, e.g., MCL 230.7 (providing treble damages for injuries to bridges); MCL 429.103 (providing double the amount of damages sustained by breach contract of sale for Michigan wheat). Although these statutes increase, rather than decrease, the amount of damages awarded, they nonetheless modify the jury award. Such increases in damages demonstrate that a defendant's right to have a jury assess liability and damages can be legislatively altered.
Second, subsection 401(3) does not violate the right to a jury trial because it does not infringe on the jury's right to decide cases. In Michigan, trial by jury encompasses the right to have a jury hear a claim and determine issues of fact. Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd Partnership v Markel, 226 Mich App 127, 132; 573 NW2d 61 (1997). The damages cap in subsection 401(3) in no way removes from the jury the determination of facts and of the amount of damages that the injured plaintiff incurred. Rather, subsection 401(3) simply limits the amount of those damages that can be recovered from a lessor of vehicles. In other words, subsection 401(3) only limits the legal consequences of the jury's finding. See Kirkland, supra at 469.
Once the jury has reached its verdict, the trial judge merely enters a judgment on the verdict that is consistent with the law. See Heinz v Chicago Road Investment Co, 216 Mich App 289, 299-300; 549 NW2d 47 (1996) (statute requiring that a jury damage award be reduced by the amount a plaintiff receives from a collateral source does not violate the right to a jury trial). Again, we agree with the Supreme Court of Idaho, that " he legal consequences and effect of a jury's verdict are a matter for the legislature (by passing laws) and the courts (by applying those laws to the facts as found by the jury)." Kirkland, supra at 469.
For these reasons, we hold that subsection 401(3) does not violate the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, ยง 14.
B. Equal Protection
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