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Truchan v. Condumex6/21/2002
was that of an express contract or agreement, either oral or written. The second subcategory was the situation in which an employer creates a situation "instinct with an obligation;" the Court endowed this theory with the sobriquet of "legitimate expectations."
With respect to the first category, the Court emphasized that there must be an express agreement to terminate only for cause, or statements of company policy or procedure to that effect. Thus, in cases where an employee claims that there was an express contract or agreement for just-cause employment, it is essential that the employee have "negotiated" with an employer for job security and that the employee agree to terminate only for cause. Here, the claim does not concern just cause employment but, rather, an asserted entitlement to severance pay. Plaintiffs assert that this entitlement derives from the severance pay policy in the Condumex handbook and is therefore "contractual in nature," because they performed services for years after Condumex issued the severance pay policy. While plaintiffs based their claim on a breach of contract theory, their argument - in large part accepted by the trial court - is primarily that they had a vested right to severance pay based upon a provision in the handbook that they assert is contractual.
Using the analytical approach contained in Toussaint - with the clear understanding that this case involves severance pay, not wrongful discharge - we see nothing in this record that supports the notion of express contract or agreement, either oral or written, concerning severance pay.
First, there is no evidence whatever that plaintiffs, or anyone else, actually "negotiated" any aspect of the severance pay policy. Second, there is no evidence that Condumex actually agreed in its handbook to extend the severance pay policy to the plaintiffs or to anyone else; indeed the handbook specifically states that it is not a statement of employee rights, that it is not to be construed as a contract for employment, and that it does not guarantee benefits, working conditions, or privileges of employment.
Plaintiffs, however, might argue that Condumex agreed to extend severance pay to plaintiffs independently of its handbook provisions, just as Blue Cross, independently of its handbook provisions, assured Charles Toussaint that he would be with the company as long as he did his job. This agreement, plaintiffs might assert, was contained in the December 8, 1997, information sheet, as supplemented by the January 30, 1998, question and answer memorandum. The problem with this argument is that, while Condumex did make an offer, that offer was to relocate the positions with the company to Texas "at the same rates of pay and under the same terms and conditions of employment (see the Condumex, Inc. Associate Handbook of Policies and Procedures) as that which exists in Livonia." Thus, the express offer was one relating to relocation, not to severance pay. Indeed, Condumex expressly stated that if an employee did not wish to stay with the company, the company would view that situation as a voluntary termination of employment by the employee. Rather clearly, the severance pay policy contained in the Condumex handbook did not apply to voluntary terminations.
As a matter of law, we can see no basis for, nor any possible factual development that would justify, finding that an express contract or agreement, either oral or written, existed that entitled plaintiffs to severance pay. Indeed, we note that, while not expressed in such terms, plaintiffs assertion that there was a vested right in such severance pay is actually a variant of the 'legitimate expectations" subcategory that the Court firs
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