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Truchan v. Condumex6/21/2002
actually move to Texas.
Plaintiffs' position was that the decision to move the operations such a great distance was a layoff under the severance policy because the Livonia workforce had, literally, been reduced to zero. This was, essentially, a constructive discharge theory. They also argued that their rights to the severance pay had "vested," providing testimony from former Condumex employee Jose Sanchez that Condumex management told him that if he chose not to move to Texas he would be "laid off according to company policy and receive a severance pay for the length of time" he worked at Condumex.
Further, having provided evidence that Condumex paid Jose Sanchez and Jeffrey Mozal the equivalent of severance pay under confidential "separation agreements" when they challenged the company's decision not to give them severance pay, plaintiffs claimed that Condumex was selectively enforcing its severance pay policy.
After hearing arguments on the motion for summary disposition, the trial court agreed with plaintiffs on all points. The trial court concluded that the statement in the severance pay policy that it was intended to assist employees in finding new employment while laid off had little real meaning. Further:
Assuming all other facts to be in favor of the Plaintiff; that is, that you did have a layoff. Say you laid off three people and kept Livonia open. Just a plain old lay off and you admit it is a layoff. That severance pay would be paid at the time of severance, and the purpose as stated . . . by the Defendant truly is a usury because you would pay it. I don't think anyone would argue that it has to be given back if the employee spent it on a night at the Casino at the MGM Grand instead of taking himself or herself through a difficult time. Permanent lay off, once you pay the severance pay, you have no control over how an employee uses that money . . . . And it is a vested right. It is vested because it never changed. This severance pay was in effect at all times. It never changed. And the note from the Handbooks says, please note the following important information, states that employment status, Company policies or procedures, anything else will be superseded by this Handbook. So the Handbook applies.
The Handbook statement of its purpose says what the employer's intent was at the time but doesn't mean that the employee is bound to that specific intent. And under Cain and the rationale of Cain, it is a vested right.
As you even admitted, if this had been a lay off . . . hey would get severance.
The argument is, were they laid off? Was there a reduction in force? That's the crux of this case. I don't believe that entirely shutting down an operation in its entirety with employees that ranged anywhere from two years back to 12 or 14 years employment, and saying move to Texas where we are only going to have one plant is, I don't think reasonable minds could differ that that is not a that that is a reduction in force. It is not a reasonable move, one which an employee can accomplish very simply by driving longer to and from work.
It is a change in the economic condition and it requires an adjustment in the staff level at the Livonia plant. The notice to the employees says . . . as a last bullet: This offer of employment will remain open until January 3, 1998.
I think by Defendant's own words they are admitting that moving to Texas is getting a new job, working in Texas at a new location.
I think that the cases cited by Plaintiff are on point. There is a contract here. The right vested because it never changed. The circumstances under which the contract was to be performed did
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