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Truchan v. Condumex6/21/2002
ted this promise, as Cain did, were allowed to rely reasonably on the company's promise. The Supreme Court observed:
The offer having thus been accepted it was not within defendant's power to withdraw it when called upon to perform. The 'change or amendment' to which the company policy was said, in its preamble, to be subject, could not encompass denial of a contract right gained through acceptance of an offer. To assert otherwise is simply to re-assert that there was no contract.
Thus, to the Supreme Court in Cain, as long as an employer's policy satisfied contract principles, any language offering the employer a unilateral ability to avoid or amend the policy at a later time could not affect whether the policy was enforceable while it existed.
Condumex argues that the Supreme Court, in Toussaint, Heurtebise, and Lytle, has effectively "amended and/or overruled" Cain, "at least to the extent that the policy sought to be enforced is included as part of an employment handbook." We need not reach such a sweeping conclusion. Rather, we note that, from the Court's rendition of the facts in Cain, that there were actually two policies in effect at the time Allen Electric terminated Cain. The first was the January 30, 1954, "supervisory and office personnel policy," with its references to "separation pay" and with disclaimers that its attorneys argued made it "not of a promissory or contractual nature." The second, apparently, was the "permanent personnel policy for termination pay" that Allen Electric's management later approved and described in its later "communication." Although the language is certainly not terribly clear, we believe that it was the second policy, the "termination pay policy," that the Court ruled was an offer of a contract that was accepted by Cain.
Thus, as we interpret Cain, the Court there held that if there is a definitive offer of a severance policy which can be considered to have been accepted by an employee through that employee's continuation of his employment with the offering company, such an offer and acceptance cannot be defeated by reference to disclaimers in more generalized personnel policies and handbooks. Rather clearly, that is not the case here. The only reference to severance pay is in the Condumex handbook; there was no separate and independent offer of severance pay to plaintiffs here. Thus, we believe Cain and similar "offer-and-acceptance" cases are distinguishable. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in its reliance on Cain. It is difficult to see here what Condumex could have done, short of not mentioning the severance policy in the handbook at all, to prevent the reading of its statement as an offer.
Again, we note that Condumex had no less than four options for directly avoiding the policies and procedures published in its handbook: it could create policies and procedures not contained in the handbook; it could interpret and apply the handbook as it saw fit; its management might decide not to apply the terms of the handbook; and it might "modify, eliminate or add to any rule, policy or benefit" in the handbook. Therefore, as a result of our de novo review, we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in not granting summary disposition to Condumex. Given our decision on this ground, we need not reach Condumex's argument that a question of disputed material fact existed concerning whether Condumex breached the contract by failing to give plaintiffs severance pay.
Reversed and remanded for entry of no cause of action in favor of Condumex. We do not retain jurisdiction.
William C. Whitbeck
Kurtis T. Wilder
Bri
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