Linzy v. St. Mary's Medical Center6/4/2002
rviewer's statements were couched in general terms, more akin to stating a policy than offering an express contract. Rowe v Montgomery Ward, 437 Mich 627, 645; 473 NW2d 268 (1991). Finally, plaintiff was aware that she could be summarily dismissed for a number of infractions. Dolan, supra at 388. In sum, plaintiff presented no evidence of a "clear and unequivocal" oral contract for just-cause employment.
Plaintiff also asserts that defendant, through its words and actions, created a "legitimate expectation" of just-cause employment. Plaintiff bases this claim, in part, on the alleged oral representations regarding job security during her pre-employment interview and also on sections in the employee manual concerning detailed discharge, fairness, and grievance procedures.
At the time plaintiff received the employee manual, she signed a statement which says clearly that the manual does not constitute an employment contract. Therefore, her reliance on the manual's grievance and discipline provisions to create legitimate expectations of a just-cause employment contract is misplaced. See Lytle, supra at 166; Heurtebise v Reliable Business Computers, Inc, 452 Mich 405, 413-414; 550 NW2d 243 (1996), cert den 520 US 1142; 117 S Ct 1311; 137 L Ed 2d 474 (1997). Moreover, the acknowledgment specifically provides that employment contracts must be in writing, signed by defendant's president, and that all oral statements regarding employment contracts are invalid.
Clearly, after she read and signed the acknowledgement, any alleged expectations of just-cause employment based on oral representations were no longer legitimate. Further, an employer may unilaterally change a written discharge-for-cause policy to an employment-at-will policy without reserving that right in advance, provided reasonable notice of the change is provided to affected employees. In re Certified Question, 432 Mich 438, 456-457; 443 NW2d 112 (1989). Because plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding either an express oral contract or legitimate expectations of just-cause employment, the trial court properly granted defendant's summary disposition motion on plaintiff's contract claims.
III. Age Discrimination
Plaintiff maintains that the trial court improperly granted summary disposition on her age discrimination claim and says that the trial court ignored evidence that other similarly situated individuals received either no discipline or more lenient discipline. We disagree.
Plaintiff alleges age discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. MCL 37.2202(1)(a) states, in relevant part, that an employer shall not: "discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment. . . , because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status." Plaintiff claims both intentional and "disparate impact" age discrimination. Alspaugh v Michigan Law Enforcement Officers Training Council, 246 Mich App 547, 563; 634 NW2d 161 (2001).
To establish a prima facie case for intentional age discrimination, plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was a member of the protected class, she suffered an adverse employment action, she was qualified for her position, and that a younger person replaced her. Hall v McRea Corp, 238 Mich App 361, 370; 605 NW2d 354 (1999), remanded on other grounds 465 Mich 919 (2001). Here, plaintiff failed to present any evidence of age animus of any kind and also failed to show that she was replaced by a younger person. Therefore, her claim for intentional age discrimination fails.
To prevail under a disparate
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