Collins v. Collins5/30/2002
ber or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court. A court may not treat retired pay as property in any proceeding to divide or partition any amount of retired pay of a member as the property of the member and the member's spouse or former spouse if a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation (including a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement incident to such decree) affecting the member and the member's spouse or former spouse (A) was issued before June 25, 1981, and (B) did not treat (or reserve jurisdiction to treat) any amount of retired pay of the member as property of the member and the member's spouse or former spouse. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1).
The Court of Appeals "has stated many times `that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intention.'" State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 81, 785 A.2d 1275 (2001) (citations omitted). When we interpret a statute, our starting point is always the text of the statute. Adamson v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 359 Md. 238, 251, 753 A.2d 501 (2000). " f the plain meaning of the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and consistent with both the broad purposes of the legislation, and the specific purpose of the provision being interpreted, our inquiry is at an end." Breitenbach v. N. B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 473, 784 A.2d 569 (2001). The plain meaning rule, however, is "elastic, rather than cast in stone[,]" and if "persuasive evidence exists outside the plain text of the statute, we do not turn a blind eye to it." Adamson, 359 Md. at 351 (citing Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513-14, 525 A.2d 628 (1987)).
" n determining a statute's meaning, courts may consider the context in which a statute appears, including related statutes and legislative history." Ridge Heating, Air Conditioning & Plumbing v. Brennen, 366 Md. 336, 350-51, 783 A.2d 691 (2001). "We may also consider the particular problem or problems the legislature was addressing, and the objectives it sought to attain." Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dep't of Employment and Training, 309 Md. 28, 40, 522 A.2d 382 (1987). "This enables us to put the statute in controversy in its proper context and thereby avoid unreasonable or illogical results that defy common sense." Adamson, 359 Md. at 252.
Lt. Col. Collins contends that the plain language of 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c) provides that any "disposable retired pay" accrued from pay periods before June 25, 1981, may not be treated as marital property. The plain language of the statute is that "a court may treat disposable retired pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981," as marital property in accordance with applicable state law. There is no question that Lt. Col. Collins' pension became "payable" after that date. The Court of Appeals has previously recognized, albeit in dicta, the legislative history of the statute makes clear that disposable retired pay benefits accrued prior to June 25, 1981, can be distributed pursuant to the USFSPA. The Court addressed 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c) in Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 564 A.2d 399 (1989).
The Andresens had been divorced on November 13, 1981, after forty years of marriage. Earlier that year, on June 26, 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court held in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1981), that military retirement pay was not marital property and so was not divisible upon divorce. The Court of Appeals had applied McCarty in Hill v. Hill, 291 Md. 615, 621, 436 A.2d 67 (1981). The trial court in Andresen, following Hill, did not award any portion of the husband's m
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