Collins v. Collins5/30/2002
t of the parties," how and when various property was acquired, and the duration of the marriage, saying, in respect to the latter factor, that "an important factor to consider in this case is the length of the marriage, it's a marriage of long duration[.]" See Bangs v. Bangs, 59 Md. App. 350, 369-70, 475 A.2d 1214 (1984).
Other marital property exists in this case. With respect to the family use personal property, the court issued a use and possession order but stated that, when the order expired, that property "shall be sold, unless the parties are able to agree otherwise upon its disposition, and the net proceeds of sale shall be divided equally between the parties." There was also a substantial list of non-family use personal property submitted to the court, but the court reserved on the issue of distribution in the hope that the parties could come to an agreement. The court put the parties on notice that, if they could not agree, it would be sold and the proceeds equitably distributed. Indeed, Lt. Col. Collins does not complain about the court's decision to distribute the parties' marital property equitably. His complaints regarding the monetary award are quite specific, and we shall address each in turn.
3. The Diamonds
With respect to the diamonds, Lt. Col. Collins complains that the court's determination that the diamonds were marital property and were worth $6,500 "was based solely on the Appellee's testimony that the Appellant had allegedly `told her sometime in the past' that he had three diamonds." Dr. Collins directs us to the court's findings and argues that they speak for themselves.
Now, there is an issue about three loose diamonds. The plaintiff testified there are diamonds that were acquired during the marriage, given to her because of an interest her husband had in diamonds. It was his testimony they were the diamonds he purchased before the marriage and were non-marital property and he sold them for $1,500. It is her testimony they were, based on what he told her, worth about $6,500. I accept her testimony, the plaintiff, I find that those three diamonds are marital property. They aren't available now so I will determine that to be $6,500 and award and equitably distribute it equally between the parties.
We have previously held that,
s a general rule, property disposed of before trial cannot be marital property. Gravenstine v. Gravenstine, 58 Md.App. 158, 177, 472 A.2d 1001 (1984). An exception to this rule is where one spouse claims that the property was improperly dissipated by the other spouse. See Rock v. Rock, 86 Md.App. 598, 618-20, 587 A.2d 1133 (1991). Once improper dissipation is alleged, the burden shifts to the spouse claiming that dissipation occurred to prove that the other spouse used the marital property during the marriage to prevent inclusion of the assets for any consideration of a monetary award. Choate v. Choate, 97 Md. App. 347, 366, 629 A.2d 1304 (1993). See also Beck v. Beck, 112 Md. App. 197, 216, 684 A.2d 878 (1996), cert. denied, 344 Md. 717, 690 A.2d 523 (1997).
Dr. Collins argued that the diamonds were dissipated. Lt. Col. Collins has maintained that he sold the diamonds because he needed the money to help pay bills.
Dr. Collins has claimed throughout that Lt. Col. Collins voluntarily impoverished himself and had the ability to pay additional support but has not done so, apparently equating improper dissipation with voluntary impoverishment. Lt. Col. Collins points out that the court, in the December 8, 2000 exceptions hearing, found no voluntary impoverishment. This finding, however, was directly related to the issue of whether Lt. Col. Collins was diligent in hi
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