Collins v. Collins5/30/2002
ing alimony proceedings); and 12-103 (concerning child custody, support or visitation). All of these statutes require the court to consider the financial resources and financial needs of both parties and whether there was substantial justification for bringing, maintaining, or defending the suit.
"When the case permits attorney's fees to be awarded, they must be reasonable, taking into account such factors as labor, skill, time, and benefit afforded to the client, as well as the financial resources and needs of each party." Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 467, 648 A.2d 1016 (1994).
Decisions concerning the award of counsel fees rest solely in the discretion of the trial judge. The proper exercise of such discretion is determined by evaluating the judge's application of the statutory criteria set forth above as well as the consideration of the facts of the particular case. Consideration of the statutory criteria is mandatory in making the award and failure to do so constitutes legal error. An award of attorney's fees will not be reversed unless a court's discretion was exercised arbitrarily or the judgment was clearly wrong. Petrini, 336 Md. at 468 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied). See also Barton v. Hirshberg, 137 Md. App. 1, 24, 767 A.2d 874 (2001). The "trial court does not have to recite any 'magical' words so long as its opinion, however phrased, does that which the statute [FL ยง 12-103(b)] requires." Beck v. Beck, 112 Md. App. 197, 212, 684 A.2d 878 (1996), cert. denied, 344 Md. 717, 690 A.2d 523 (1997).
It appears that the award of $17,500 was a compromise amount reached by the trial court. During closing argument, Dr. Collins' counsel explained that the South Dakota lawyer's fees were approximately $2,300 and that the bill from her Maryland law firm was in excess of $25,000. The petition for attorneys' fees included two attachments, one of which was the billing statement for the South Dakota attorney, whose fees and costs totaled $2,324.11. The other attachment was a billing statement from Dr. Collins' Maryland attorney, whose fees and costs totaled $17,249.85. In the petition, Dr. Collins' attorney estimated that her fees in connection with the trial would amount to $8,800. This left Dr. Collins with approximately $22,875 in unpaid attorneys' fees and costs.
The trial court clearly addressed the statutory factor of justification. With respect to the first factor, the parties' financial situation, and the second factor, the needs of the parties, we note that Lt. Col. Collins put the court on notice that he did not have the means to pay the attorneys' fees:
[LT. COL. COLLINS' ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, with all due respect, I am not arguing with the Judge's decision but if he is going to be paying a monetary award of approximately $9,400 if I added it correctly and the arrearage is $17,500, he has no means to pay that.
THE COURT: Okay.
[LT. COL. COLLINS' ATTORNEY]: You know, I am not arguing with the decision.
THE COURT: That's okay. Ma'am, I -
[LT. COL. COLLINS' ATTORNEY]: But he has no means to pay those.
The court recognized throughout its oral ruling that Dr. Collins' attorneys' fees were a financial burden for her and were caused primarily by Lt. Col. Collins' actions by litigating in two separate jurisdictions and by his refusal to cooperate in the Maryland action. The court also recognized that Lt. Col. Collins' "gross income including his pension is $11,377 a month."
In addition, the court found that Lt. Col. Collins both deliberately and willfully underpaid support for a lengthy period of time and that he had, in some cases, dissipated marital as
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