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Collins v. Collins5/30/2002
wer of the equity courts to reserve on the issue of alimony, and it observed "`when a Court enters a decree of divorce; it may also award alimony or reserve the right to do so[.]'" Turrisi, 308 Md. at 527 (quoting 1980 Report at 1) (emphasis supplied). Neither the Report nor the legislation made any further reference to reservation of alimony. The Court stated that
o ask us to assume that by mere silence the legislature intended to abolish a long-standing inherent power of Maryland equity courts, specifically called to its attention by the Commission, is to ask too much. Repeal of such a power by silence is not favored, see Hoffman v. Key Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 286 Md. 28, 43, 416 A.2d 1265, 1269 (1979), and we shall not indulge any such assumption here. Nor do we believe that the legislative intent demonstrated by the purposes of the Alimony Act, see McAlear[ v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 343 n. 23, 469 A.2d 1256 (1984)], requires us to hold that the power to reserve alimony has been abrogated. ...
For example, facts before a court may demonstrate no present basis for either rehabilitative or indefinite alimony. But those same facts may show that a highly probable basis for awarding one or the other will exist in the immediate future. Under such circumstances, we see no reason why reservation would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. Indeed, under such circumstances, reservation would be consistent with the Act's overall purpose, as we defined it in McAlear, 298 Md. at 348, 469 A.2d at 1271: "The purpose of the 1980 Alimony Act is to provide for an appropriate degree of spousal support in the form of alimony after the dissolution of the marriage."
We hold, therefore, that the Alimony Act has not abolished the inherent power of an equity court to reserve jurisdiction as to alimony when it awards a divorce. Turrisi, 308 Md. at 527-28.
The Court cautioned, however, that the power to reserve was within the discretion of the trial court and should not be exercised in every case. Whether a court should "exercise discretion in favor of reservation is a matter affected by various considerations, non-statutory as well as statutory." Turrisi, 308 Md. at 528. There must be more than a "vague future expectation of circumstances that might show a basis for alimony" or the mere possibility that, at some "unknown future date," "a claimant might become aged, infirm, or disabled, or that standards of living could conceivably be unconscionably disparate[.]" Id. at 529. The Court of Appeals also cautioned that reservation of alimony in cases where a monetary award has been made requires "the most careful exercise of discretion." Id., at 529.
This court has reviewed the issue of reservation of alimony in a recent case. Durkee v. Durkee, ___ Md. App. ___ ,No. 158, September Term, 2001, 2002 Md. App. LEXIS 73 (May 1, 2002). Although the parties were not privy to this case law at the time of oral argument, it deserves discussion. In Durkee, the husband had been laid off as the result of a reduction in force and elected to start his own business. This was apparently not a serious venture, however, as he spent little time on the business and earned little income after he lost his job. The parties separated and eventually divorced. "Although the [circuit] court did not expressly find that appellant had deliberately attempted to impoverish himself so as to dodge the payment of alimony, the evidence demonstrated that appellant's efforts regarding his business venture were hardly serious." Durkee, 2002 Md. App. LEXIS 73 at *22.
The wife, who seemed to recognize that husband was unable to pay her alimony in light of his financial situation, requested the re
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