Plein v. Department of Labor6/12/2002
ted. Therefore, we opined: " ot being directly related to, attributable to or connected with the employee's employment or the actions of that employing unit, offers of higher pay as an inducement to leave existing employment must fall, if at all, into this latter category," id. at 401, 758 A.2d at 131, that is, they must meet the "necessitous and compelling" test. Id. Under that stricter test, we reiterated, "more needs to be shown than that the precipitating event or cause ""`would reasonably [have] impel the average able-bodied qualified worker to give up his or her employment."'" Id., quoting Paynter, 303 Md. at 36-37, 491 A.2d at 1193, in turn quoting Uniweld Products, Inc. v. Indus. Relations Comm'n, Etc., 277 So.2d 827, 829 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.1973).
The Court also was persuaded by the absolute disqualifications prescribed in § 8-1001 (d). In that regard, we noted:
"By denying unemployment benefits to employees who leave work to go into business, to relocate with a spouse or to go to school, that section makes clear that purely personal reasons for leaving work will not suffice as a predicate for unemployment benefits. It is difficult to reconcile, except on that basis--going into business for oneself is a personal matter--why the Legislature would permit an employee, who voluntarily terminates permanent and otherwise satisfactory employment for increased wages, on the theory that his or her prospects and financial condition are thereby improved, to be eligible for unemployment benefits, while at the same time denying the same right to a claimant, who, for the same reasons, voluntarily leaves work to go into business for him or herself. Accepting more money and changing jobs is as much of a gamble and thus, as much of a personal matter, as going into business for oneself. In our view, it is unmistakably clear that § 8-1001(a) was not designed to provide benefits when the precipitating cause for the voluntary leaving of the employment was for higher pay or a better job. Instead, it was designed to prevent hardship to persons who lose their jobs, through no fault of their own."[ ] Total Audio-Visual, 360 Md. at 400-01, 758 A.2d at 131-32.
Finally, we found § 8-611, especially the prohibition contained in subsection (e) (4), to be both instructive and consistent. Id. at 402, 758 A.2d at 132. We reasoned:
"Under § 8-611(e),... " he Secretary may not charge benefits paid to a claimant against the earned rating record of an employing unit if ... (4) the claimant left employment voluntarily to accept better employment or enter training approved by the Secretary." (Emphasis added). If, given the specific provisions of § 8-611(e)(4), the earned rating record of the employing unit which the claimant left voluntarily to accept better employment cannot be charged for the benefits payable as a result of a subsequent lay off, then it seems strange indeed that, as to that employing unit, leaving employment voluntarily to accept better employment would be considered good cause for leaving work. Thus, while, pursuant to § 8-1001(a), a claimant may be eligible for unemployment benefits, the determination whether those benefits should or may be paid is employer specific.[ ] Reading § 8-1001(a) as the appellee proposes would render § 8-611(e)(4) meaningless. See, Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge No. 35 v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 180, 680 A.2d 1052, 1065 (1996) (" or should we interpret a statutory scheme so as to render any part of it meaningless or nugatory.")," id. at 404, 758 at 133, and concluded:
"[the claimant] was not, at the time of his voluntary departure eligible for unemployment benefits because the claimant left his employment with the petiti
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Maryland Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|