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Jordan Towing6/12/2002 tely demonstrated."
We affirm this finding of the Circuit Court that appellees had standing before the Board of Appeals and the Circuit Court challenging the granting of appellant's license. At the administrative level appellees were "aggrieved" under the relevant Baltimore County Code section because their businesses are directly affected by the issuance of an additional towing license in the geographical area where they alone hold licenses. A party is aggrieved and there is standing if the party suffers some "special damage . . . differing in character and kind from that suffered by the general public." Weinberg v. Kracke, 189 Md. 275, 280, 55 A.2d 797, 799 (1947); see Sugarloaf Citizens Assn. v. MDE, 344 Md. 271, 686 A.2d 605 (1996); Inlet Associates v. Assateague House Condo. Assn., 313 Md. 413, 545 A.2d 1296 (1988); Becker v. Litty, 318 Md. 76, 566 A.2d 1101(1989); Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Board of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 230 A.2d 289 (1967). In Sugarloaf, 344 Md. at 295, 686 A.2d at 617, this Court discussed aggrievement and emphasized that standing does not depend on the type of issue raised or its likelihood of success and stated:
"Therefore, standing to challenge governmental action, and the merits of the challenge, are separate and distinct issues.... `The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a ... court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated'." [Citations omitted.]
For the reasons stated supra and under the facts of this case, appellees were proper parties to this action and had standing when they appealed the DPM's decision to the Board of Appeals.
We do not directly answer the remaining questions. We shall, however, affirm the decision of the Board of Appeals reversing the issuance of the towing license to appellant. We hold that the Baltimore County Code provisions at issue in the case sub judice cannot be interpreted, under the facts here present, in such a way as to permit the granting of a towing license to appellant.
I. Facts
a. The Towing Application Process
The case sub judice involves an application by appellant for a towing permit, which is regulated under the Baltimore County Code. The provision regarding the license requirement reads in pertinent part:
"Sec. 24-226. License required to engage in towing business; storage facilities required.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in towing disabled vehicles from the scene of a motor vehicle accident occurring within the county without first having obtained a license from the department of permits and licenses to do so as hereinafter provided or during the suspension or revocation thereof."
The DPM is vested with the authority to determine whether to approve an application for a towing license in accordance with section 24-229, which states:
"Sec. 24-229. Approval of new license towers; location requirements.
(a) New licensed towers shall be approved by the Department of Permits and Licenses based upon the need for additional service. If the need does not exist, the application will not be approved. The transfer of an existing license shall be treated in the same manner as a new license, and any such transfer shall be subject to all provisions applicable thereto."
While the Baltimore County Code does not specify the criteria to be considered in determining the "need for additional [towing] service," the typical practice within the DPM when a towing license application is submitted for a specific geographical area is to refer the application to the Baltimore County Police De
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