Jordan Towing6/12/2002
pretation of an administrative regulation is "of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S. Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L. Ed. 1700, 1702 (1945).'
In Md. Comm'n On Human Relations v. Bethlehem Steel, 295 Md. 586, 592-593, 457 A.2d 1146 (1983), Judge Davidson for the Court explained:
`This Court has recognized that the interpretation of an agency rule is governed by the same principles that govern the interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Beads, 288 Md. 161, 176, 416 A.2d 739, 747 (1980); Messitte v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co. Assocs., Inc., 287 Md. 289, 293, 411 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1980). More important, agency rules are designed to serve the specific needs of the agency, are promulgated by the agency, and are utilized on a day-to-day basis by the agency. A question concerning the interpretation of an agency's rule is as central to its operation as an interpretation of the agency's governing statute. Because an agency is best able to discern its intent in promulgating a regulation, the agency's expertise is more pertinent to the interpretation of an agency's rule than to the interpretation of its governing statute.'
For recent cases setting forth the principle that deference should be given to agency interpretations, see, e.g., Division of Labor v. Triangle, 366 Md. 407, 416-417, 784 A.2d 534 (2001); Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 172-173, 783 A.2d 169 (2001); State Ethics Commission v. Antonetti, 365 Md. 428, 446-447, 780 A.2d 1154 (2001); Adamson v. Correctional Medical Services, 359 Md. 238, 266, 753 A.2d 501, 516 (2000); Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999); Lussier v. Md. Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681, 696-697, 684 A.2d 804, 811-812 (1996)." MTA, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___.
IV. Conclusion
We hold that the "Need Criteria" remain the applicable standards for need in respect to the issuance of a new towing license in Baltimore County and that the DPM cannot go beyond this interpretation of need if the established criteria have not first been sufficiently satisfied. The Board of Appeals was legally correct to conclude that the DPM, using race alone as the sole need criterion, should not have granted appellant's towing license application and that its action was arbitrary and capricious. There was substantial evidence to support the Board of Appeals' decision on the ground that the proper need standards were not applied to this particular license application. The Circuit Court, therefore, properly affirmed the decision of the Board of Appeals.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
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