Tyma v. Montgomery County6/14/2002
ument, and the Circuit Court's conclusion, that the Act is well within the scope of the authority delegated to the County under § 5(S).
The determination that the County has the authority to pass the subject Act under § 5 (S) also disposes of the appellants' argument that the Act is general, or non-local, legislation. Such benefits legislation, moreover, does not infringe upon the State's interest in marriage. This Court has invalidated ordinances passed by Home Rule counties only when they have intruded on some well defined State interest. See McCrory v. Fowler, supra, 319 Md. at 20, 570 A.2d at 938. In McCrory, Montgomery County enacted an ordinance providing a private cause of action for violations of the county's employment discrimination ordinance. Noting that " n Maryland, the creation of new causes of action in the courts has traditionally been done either by the General Assembly or by this Court under its authority to modify the common law of this State" and that "the creation of new judicial remedies has traditionally been done on a statewide basis," id., citing Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981), this Court struck the ordinance down as a non-local law. See Dash v. Jackson, supra, (state statute concerning the licensing of paper hangers in Baltimore City was not a "local law" within the meaning of Article XI-A ); Gaither v. Jackson, supra, (state statute providing for gubernatorial appointment of auctioneers in Baltimore City, with payment by the auctioneers of license fees and duties to the State, was not a "local law" under Article XI-A); Bradshaw v. Lankford, 73 Md. 428, 431-33, 21 A. 66, 66-67 (1891) (because it would deprive people of the entire state of the common right to take oysters within the waters of that county, prohibition of oyster dredging in Somerset County is not a "local law").
To be sure, in the Act, the requirements for domestic partnership generally parallel those for marriage. See § 33-22( c), supra, n. 1. On the other hand, the Act does not create "a legal equivalency between lawful spouses and same-sex domestic partners" or otherwise impinge upon the State's interest in marriage. It simply provides that " ny benefit the County provides for the spouse ... of a County employee or the spouse's dependent must be provided, in the same manner and to the same extent, for the domestic partner of a County employee and the partner's dependents, respectively." See § 33-22(b). And that essentially is all that it does. Nothing in the Act purports to, or can be construed to, create an alternate form of marriage, authorize common law marriage or create any legal relationship. Nor does the Act, by its terms or implication, restrict, modify or alter any rights incident to a marriage recognized in this State or give one domestic partner rights, beyond the employment benefits enumerated, against the other. And, as the State of Maryland, as amicus curiae, points out:
"The partners gain no rights in property and income of the other that are earned during the marriage and have no legally protected share in each other's estates. Termination of the relationship requires no legal process or judicial intervention, and can be done unilaterally by the filing of a notice with the county."
As a matter of fact, therefore and in sum, the Act affects only the personnel policies of Montgomery County and does not implicate the State's interest in marriage or affect the State's ability to regulate marriage on a statewide basis. Moreover, the only employer the ordinance impacts is the County; it has no effect outside the County and, therefore, no statewide interests are affected. The ordinance simply has no resemblance to other enactments that
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