Tyma v. Montgomery County6/14/2002
rcuit Court rejected all of these arguments. Thus, it granted the County's motion for summary judgment, denied the appellants' cross-motion, and declared the Act constitutional. Dissatisfied with that result, the appellants noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and filed in this Court a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted while the appeal was pending in the intermediate appellate court. As indicated, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court, holding that, despite the challenges presented by the appellants, the County's action in passing the Act is authorized under the constitution and laws of this State and that it conflicts with neither State nor federal law.
II.
The trial court properly grants summary judgment, in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-501(e), "if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 675-76, 766 A.2d 617, 624-25 (2001); Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., 335 Md. 135, 144, 642 A.2d 219, 224 (1994); Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 255, 630 A.2d 1156, 1160 (1993). This Court, like any appellate court, reviews the grant of summary judgment to determine whether the trial court was legally correct in entering the judgment. Murphy v. Merzbacher, 346 Md. 525, 530-31, 697 A.2d 861, 864 (1997); Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 343 Md. 185, 204, 680 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996); Hartford Ins. Co., 335 Md. at 144, 642 A.2d at 224; Gross, 332 Md. at 255, 630 A.2d at 1160. And, because an appellate court has `"the same information from the record and decide[s ] the same issues of law as the trial court,'" its review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Green v. H&R;Block, Inc., 355 Md. 488, 502, 735 A.2d 1039, 1047 (1999) (quoting Heat & Power, 320 Md. 584, 591-92, 578 A.2d 1202, 1206 (1990)).
III.
Article XI-A of the State Constitution, known as the "Home Rule Amendment," enabled counties, like Montgomery County, which chose to adopt a home rule charter, to achieve a significant degree of political self-determination. See McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12, 16, 570 A.2d 834, 835 (1990). "Its purpose was to transfer the General Assembly's power to enact many types of county public local laws to the Art. XI-A home rule counties." Id. at 16, 570 A.2d at 836, citing generally, Bd. of Election Laws v. Talbot County, 316 Md. 332, 344, 558 A.2d 724, 730 (1989); Griffith v. Wakefield, 298 Md. 381, 384, 470 A.2d 345, 347 (1984); Town of Forest Heights v. Frank, 291 Md. 331, 342, 435 A.2d 425 (1981); Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 597-598, 415 A.2d 255, 256 (1980). We explained the rationale in State v. Stewart, 152 Md. 419, 422, 137 A. 39, 41 (1927):
"The wisdom of incorporating in the organic law of the state such provisions as are contained in this article had been urged for a number of years prior to its adoption, the reasons assigned by its proponents being that a larger measure of home rule be secured to the people of the respective political subdivisions of the state in matters of purely local concern, in order that there should be the fullest measure of local self-government, and that these local questions should thus be withdrawn from consideration by the General Assembly, leaving that body more time to consider and pass upon general legislation, and to prevent the passage of such legislation from being influenced by what is popularly known as 'log-rolling'; that is, by influencing the attitude and vote of members of the General Assembly upon proposed general laws by threatening the defeat or
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