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Wholey v. Sears Roebuck6/19/2002
(b) Penalty. -- A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 5 years.
A "witness" is defined as a person who:
(1) Has knowledge of the existence of facts relating to a crime or delinquent act;
(2) Makes a declaration under oath that is received as evidence for any purpose;
(3) Has reported a crime or delinquent act to a law enforcement officer, prosecutor, intake officer, correctional officer, or judicial officer; or
(4) Has been served with a subpoena issued under the authority of a court of this State, of any other state, or of the United States. See Md. Code(1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27, §760(e).
The particular definitions of witness which are germane to the prohibition in Section 762 are found in subsections (1) and (2) of Section 760(d): A witness who " akes a declaration under oath that is received as evidence for any purpose" pursuant to Section 760(d)(2) is a witness against whom retaliation is prohibited for "giving testimony in an official proceeding" pursuant to Section 762(a). A witness who " as reported a crime or delinquent act to a law enforcement officer, prosecutor, intake officer, correctional officer, or judicial officer" pursuant to Section 760(d)(2) is a witness against whom retaliation is prohibited for "reporting a crime or delinquent act." Md. Code, Art. 27, §762(a). From these statutory provisions, a clearly definable public policy goal is derived: the Legislature sought to protect those witnesses who report suspected criminal activity to the appropriate law enforcement or judicial authority from being harmed for performing this important public task. From this clearly definable public policy, we are able to adopt a civil cause of action in wrongful discharge for employees who are discharged for reporting suspected criminal activity to the appropriate authorities.
It appears, then, that the Legislature has created a cognizable statutory interest in the ability to report crimes or testify at an official proceeding without fear of retaliation in terms of personal or property damage. Similar to our decision in Ewing, supra, where we held that while Article 101, Section 39A created a criminal cause against those employers who discharge an employee for filing workers' compensation claims, the tort of wrongful discharge provides a civil remedy, see Ewing, 312 Md. at 49-50, 537 A.2d at 1174-75, we now conclude that while Section 762 creates a criminal cause against those who retaliate against witnesses who report crimes, the tort of wrongful discharge provides a civil remedy. See Makovi, 316 Md. at 612, 561 A.2d at 183 (discussing this Court's holding in Ewing and noting that a criminal statutory sanction would not preclude the wrongful discharge tort). Thus, we hold that terminating employment on the grounds that the employee (as a victim or witness) gave testimony at an official proceeding or reported a suspected crime to the appropriate law enforcement or judicial officer is wrongful and contrary to public policy.
This conclusion is in line with our analysis in Molesworth, supra, in which the decisional issue was whether Section 14 of Article 49B provided a "sufficiently clear mandate of public policy" to support a common law wrongful discharge cause of action. See 341 Md. at 630, 672 A.2d at 613. We resolved to determine whether the specific term "employer" as used in Section 14, included those employers who were exempt by Section 15(b). In so doing, we used the plain language of the statute to discern the legislative intent, namely that any employer was prohibited from discriminati
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