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Wholey v. Sears Roebuck6/19/2002
nlike the plurality, I would affirm on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of the Court of Special Appeals.
The plurality holds that "a clear public policy mandate exists in the State of Maryland which protects employees from a termination based upon the reporting of suspected criminal activities to the appropriate law enforcement authorities." See ante at 1. The case before us, however, involves an employee reporting to his supervisors, not to law enforcement officials. There is no clear public policy mandate that protects workers who report suspected crimes to their superiors. Therefore, I would not reach out to create a new exception to the at-will employment doctrine in a case not ripe for such decision. Inasmuch as the plaintiff herein has not stated facts to justify any exception to the at-will employment doctrine, this Court should not introduce expansive public policy dicta into the opinion. The Court pays lip service to the notion that we should proceed cautiously when called upon to declare public policy absent some legislative or judicial expression on the subject. See ante at 34. Nonetheless, the Court creates a tort cause of action in a case where the facts alleged by the plaintiff do not constitute a cause of action. See ante at 34.
Even if it were necessary to touch on the question addressed by the plurality, I would reach a different conclusion. This Court has recognized an exception to the at-will employment doctrine where the discharge of an employee violates a clear mandate of public policy. Adler v. American Standard Co., 291 Md. 31, 40, 432 A.2d 464, 469 (1981). This exception, however, is a narrow one. Maryland courts have found a violation of a clear mandate of public policy only in limited circumstances: where an employee has been fired for refusing to violate the law or the legal rights of a third party, see Kessler v. Equity Management, Inc., 82 Md. App. 577, 572 A.2d 1144 (1990) (holding that firing an at-will employee for refusing to commit the tort of invasion of privacy constitutes wrongful discharge), and where an employee has been terminated for exercising a specific legal right or duty. See Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 588 A.2d 760 (1991) (holding that is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy for an employer to discharge an employee for seeking legal redress against a co-worker for sexual harassment); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 537 A.2d 1173 (1988) (holding that discharging an employee for filing a worker's compensation claim contravenes clear mandate of public policy); see also Milton v. ITT Research Inst., 138 F.3d 519 (4th Cir. 1998); Adler v. American Standard Co., 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987).
In the case sub judice, the Court of Special Appeals found that petitioner's claim did not fit under either of these categories, and that petitioner was therefore precluded from maintaining a cause of action for wrongful discharge. Sears v. Wholey, 139 Md. App. 642; 779 A.2d 408 (2001). I agree with this conclusion.
Even assuming that this Court would recognize an exception to the at-will employment doctrine in a case where an employee is required to report a crime to the authorities and is then discharged by an employer for doing so, the plurality has adopted a much broader exception. The plurality states that " courts must . . . use care in creating new public policy . . . ." Ante at 11, 28 (holding that " his court now adopts a public policy mandate for employees who report criminal activity to the appropriate law enforcement authorities. . . ."). Ironically, it is lack of caution or care that is the Achilles heel of the plurality opinion. In creating exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine, court
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