Lee v. International Data Group6/10/2002
the question whether IDG carried workers' compensation insurance for its employees on the date of the accident.
Although the complaint is vague in its conciseness, the plaintiff conceded that the cause of action against IDG was based upon the existence of at least a de jure employment relationship between the plaintiff and IDG. Accordingly, the complaint may be viewed as alleging that IDG did not insure its employees for workers' compensation purposes, thereby giving rise to a cause of action against the employer at law. See G.áL. c.á152, §§á66,á67. Even if the judge had correctly determined that the separate identities of IDG and East West should be disregarded (a determination with which we disagree, see noteá7, infra), the resulting conclusion, that IDG and East West are one and the same, leads to the same ultimate factual reality for purposes of the summary judgment proceedings in this case --that the plaintiff was an employee of IDG. See Berger v. H.P. Hood, Inc., 416 Mass. 652, 656-657 (1993), S.C., 424 Mass. 144 (1997).
Thus, under either theory of liability, the cause of action ultimately rests upon the allegation that IDG failed to insure its employees, thereby exposing it to liability in an action for damages. Moreover, in the absence of a reservation of rights by the employee under G.áL. c.á152, §á24, jurisdiction to maintain a cause of action in Superior Court against an employer for injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment must be based solely upon the employer's alleged failure to secure workers' compensation insurance for its employees. See G.áL. c.á152, §§á66,á67. There is, however, no doubt on this record that IDG was in fact insured for workers' compensation purposes prior to and on the date of the plaintiff's injury. As a result, the issue of the plaintiff's employment status should not have been sorted out in the Superior Court in the first instance, because if she was an employee of IDG (as she claimed and the judge found), the DIA has exclusive jurisdiction over this action. G.áL. c.á152, §á24. Consequently, the complaint should have been dismissed.
Contrary to the plaintiff's appellate claim, allowing IDG's jurisdictional motion would not result in "a windfall for unscrupulous employers" who would be able to insulate themselves from G.áL. c.á152, §á66, liability by insuring only one employee while leaving "one thousand employees" uninsured. If the plaintiff was, or could be deemed, an employee of IDG, she would be covered by IDG's workers' compensation policy. See Locke, Workmen's Compensation §á126, atá130 (2dáed. 1981) ("When an employer becomes a subscriber, the insurer assumes an obligation as broad as the act toward all employees within the business. The act does not permit an employer to become a subscriber as to one part of its business and to remain a non-subscriber as to the rest of a business which is in substance and effect conducted as one enterprise"). Moreover, " hat the terms of the policy do not appear in the record is of no consequence. The employee has against an insurer all the rights which the [workers'] compensation act gives him, whatever limitations are written in the policy." Stoltz's Case, 325 Mass. 692, 696 (1950).
In any event, to the extent an issue of insurance coverage may exist, the DIA has full power to decide such questions of coverage raised in connection with a claim for compensation, and " he parties have no right to try out the issue in a separate proceeding in court." Locke, Workmen's Compensation §á131, atá136. Compare Luchini v. Commissioner of Rev., 436 Mass. 403, 404-405 (2002) (where the agency has jurisdiction to provide an administrative remedy, it should be invoked prior to seeking jud
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