Lee v. International Data Group6/10/2002
Suffolk.
November 14, 2001
Workers' Compensation Act, Coverage, Jurisdiction of court, Jurisdiction of Industrial Accident Board.
In December, 1994, Sylvia Liotta (the plaintiff), who had suffered serious and permanently debilitating injuries when she fell down a flight of stairs in December, 1991, while at work, commenced a negligence action against the appellant, International Data Group (IDG). Her complaint alleged that IDG (whom she subsequently contended had been her employer) had a responsibility to maintain workers' compensation insurance covering her, which it had failed to do. As a result, the plaintiff asserted, she was unable to secure workers' compensation benefits and was, therefore, entitled to damages at law. In response, IDG contended, among other things, that it had in fact carried workers' compensation insurance at all relevant times and that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies available from the Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA), which (IDG argued) had exclusive jurisdiction over her claim.
In July, 1995, IDG filed a motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), 365 Mass. 755 (1974), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 755 (1974); or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, under Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(b), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). In opposition, the plaintiff asserted that during discovery, IDG had effectively denied that it had workers' compensation insurance that covered her. She reiterated her contention that IDG had responsibility for her employment, either directly or as the controlling alter ego of the individual and organizations which had hired her.
Before IDG's motion was heard, in February, 1998, the plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment. In April, 1998, a Superior Court judge denied IDG's motion for summary judgment and allowed the plaintiff's motion. The judge held that the undisputed facts established that IDG had so pervasively controlled the organizations for which the plaintiff had worked in 1991 (BCE and East West, see noteá2, supra) as to be deemed her employer (under the "disregard of corporate identity" principle, see My Bread Baking Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 618-619 ); and that IDG was consequently liable for its failure to provide workers' compensation insurance for her. Following the judge's denials of two motions for reconsideration and his assessment against IDG of the same $1,315,238 in damages previously assessed against her original employers (Randall and East West, see noteá2, supra), final judgment was entered against IDG in that amount.
IDG makes three arguments on appeal: (1)áthe judge erred in denying its motion for summary judgment, because the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action; (2)áin any event, as matter of law, the facts did not support the conclusion that the separate corporate identities should be disregarded; and (3)áthe judge erred in imposing upon IDG the damages assessed against East West and Randall without giving IDG an opportunity to defend against the damages claim. We agree with IDG's first argument, that it was entitled to summary judgment on its showing of a want of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court and, accordingly, reverse.
Under G.áL. c.á152, an employer's obligation to obtain workers' compensation insurance is limited to providing coverage for its own employees. G.áL. c.á152, §§á1(5),á25A. Whether or not the plaintiff was an employee of IDG entitled to claim workers' compensation benefits is an issue that is distinct from
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