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Bryant v. City of Blackfoot5/31/2002
2002 Opinion No. 64
The order of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The plaintiff Joanne Lynn Bryant (Bryant) appeals from an order dismissing this action on the motion for summary judgment filed by the City of Blackfoot (City). We affirm the dismissal in part, reverse it in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The City employed Bryant as an operator at the wastewater treatment plant. On April 11, 1997, she fell down a flight of stairs while at work, injuring her right shoulder. Due to her injury, she took a leave of absence from her employment and eventually underwent surgery. On December 2, 1997, her physician cleared her to return to work with certain lifting restrictions. She alleges that when she attempted to return to work, she was told there was no position available due to her inability to "do a man's work."
On August 25, 1998, Bryant filed this action alleging four causes of action. In her first cause of action, she alleged that the City wrongfully terminated her employment in violation of public policy, in that it did so because she had filed a worker's compensation claim. In her second cause of action, she alleged that by terminating her employment because of her industrial accident and her worker's compensation claim, the City violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in her employment contract. In her third cause of action, she alleged that by terminating her employment, the City violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act). In her fourth cause of action, she alleged that the City's conduct in terminating her employment and in discriminating against her because of her gender and her disability entitled her to relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
On October 22, 1999, the City moved for summary judgment alleging that Bryant had failed to comply with certain procedural requirements prior to filing her action. With respect to the first and second causes of action, the City alleged that Bryant had failed to comply with Idaho Code § 50-219 which required her to give timely notice to the City of those claims. With respect to the claims based upon the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title VII, the City alleged Bryant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by first filing a claim with either the Idaho Human Rights Commission or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. With respect to Bryant's claim based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the City argued that she could not sue under that statute to recover for claims that were based upon conduct that violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or Title VII because the enforcement provisions of those statutes were exclusive. The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, and Bryant appealed.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Eagle Water Company, Inc. v. Roundy Pole Fence Company, Inc., 134 Idaho 626, 7 P.3d 1103 (2000). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
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