 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Hull v. Second Injury Fund6/19/2002
observed no objective evidence supports the work restrictions on Hull's right arm. As the district court stated, "It was up to [the doctor] to explain any suggested limitation." The doctor did not do so. Additionally, we have already concluded evidence supported the commissioner's view that Hull had no intention of looking for work. Finally, we find the commissioner's observation that the vocational expert made no attempt to find Hull employment reflects the degree to which the commissioner weighed the expert's testimony. See Second Injury Fund v. Braden, 459 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Iowa 1990) (noting that a credibility determination may be inherent in a commissioner's ruling). Overall, we find the commissioner's decision to be rational.
C.
Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(f) requires the court to reverse an agency action if:
Based upon a determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole.
Hull claims there is not substantial evidence to support the commissioner's conclusion that he is 45% disabled. In support of this argument, Hull makes reference to the arguments raised above. We find substantial evidence supports the commissioner's decision.
D.
Hull finally argues the commissioner's decision is "unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion" in violation of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(n). We find the commissioner's 45% industrial disability assessment is reasonable and, accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
|