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Hull v. Second Injury Fund6/19/2002
Lyle Hull appeals from the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's award of forty-five percent industrial disability benefits. AFFIRMED.
Lyle Hull appeals the district court's ruling on judicial review affirming the workers' compensation commissioner's award of forty-five percent (45%) industrial disability benefits under Iowa Code section 85.64 (1999). He contends the district court erred because the agency's decision is legally erroneous and his substantial rights have been prejudiced. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Lyle Hull worked as a laborer with AZ Manufacturing in 1995 when he sought treatment for an injury to his left arm. He brought an action against the Second Injury Fund of Iowa for recovery of benefits pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.64. He alleged his first injury was a combination of the loss of use of his right foot due to a clubfoot and a 1974 injury to his left knee.
After a hearing, the deputy workers' compensation commissioner determined Hull's clubfoot and previous knee injury were qualifying first losses as required by section 85.64. Combining these losses with Hull's arm injury, the deputy concluded Hull suffered a 45% industrial disability. Hull appealed the decision, arguing he was totally disabled. The chief deputy worker's compensation commissioner affirmed. On appeal, the district court likewise denied Hull's claim.
II. Scope of Review.
We review a district court's review of agency action for correction of errors of law. IBP v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001). Our review is limited to whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its judicial review function. Id. We are bound by the industrial commissioner's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the same conclusion. St. Luke's Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 2000).
III. Assessment of the Industrial Disability.
Hull contends the district court erred in assessing his industrial disability at 45% instead of a total disability. He claims the agency action is erroneous and substantially prejudiced his rights by violating Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(f), (i), (m), and (n). We address each argument in turn.
A.
Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(m) requires the court to reverse an agency action if it is " ased upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of law to fact that has clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency." Hull first argues the workers' compensation commissioner's determination of a 45% permanent partial disability is based upon an irrational, illogical, and wholly unjustifiable application of law to fact because the commissioner had to have found there are jobs he could do in the community for which he could realistically compete. He contends there is no evidence in the record to support this conclusion.
In determining industrial disability, the commissioner is to consider the following factors:
the employee's medical condition prior to the injury, immediately after the injury, and presently; the situs of the injury, its severity and the length of the healing period; the work experience of the employee prior to the injury and after the injury and the potential for rehabilitation; the employee's qualifications intellectually, emotionally, and physically; earnings prior and subsequent to the injury; age; education; motivation; functional impairment as a result of the injury; inability, b
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