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Parker v. Crider Poultry6/24/2002
d for the company from 1974 to 1982 and her contract of employment for indefinite duration was held to be outside the Statute of Frauds; Trade City GMC v. May, 154 Ga. App. 371 (2) (268 SE2d 421) (1980), where the employee had worked for 16 months and his employment contract of indefinite duration was held to be outside the Statute of Frauds. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred when it determined that the employment agreement relied upon by Parker was within the Statute of Frauds because Parker had completed over a year of employment under the contract before the dispute arose. The trial court misplaced its reliance when it cited Gatins v. NCR Corp., supra, 180 Ga. App. 595, because that case is distinguishable in that the contracts sought to be enforced therein were not to be performed within one year of their making and therefore had to be in writing under the Statute of Frauds. When a contract is required to be in writing, the writings relied upon must contain the entire agreement. Id.
2. Because of their separate determinations that the Statute of Frauds was applicable to Parker's employment agreement, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals addressed the merits of Parker's assertion that the Crider corporations breached the employment agreement when they did not adhere to the three-months' notice provision. While an employee with an employment agreement of indefinite duration may not successfully pursue a wrongful termination claim upon termination of employment, the employee has a claim for breach of contract if the employer had agreed to give notice of termination but did not. Burritt v. Media Marketing Services, 204 Ga. App. 848 (2) (420 SE2d 792) (1992). See also King Industrial Realty v. Rich, 224 Ga. App. 629 (481 SE2d 861) (1997). In the case at bar, Parker sent a letter to W. A. Crider, Jr., on May 7, 1998, informing Crider that
This serves as my written notice of my intention to exercise, under our agreement, my option to resign my position by providing three months notice to you. Therefore, I resign as President/CEO of Crider, Inc. and Crider Poultry, Inc. ninety days from this date or on Wednesday, August 5, 1998.
In his deposition, Parker testified that he recognized Crider had the authority to determine whether Parker worked during the three-month period between notice and resignation, that Crider accepted the resignation immediately on May 7, and that Parker did not return to work at Crider during the three-month period. It is unclear whether Parker's failure to work at Crider during the notice period was due to the fact that Crider accepted the notice of resignation and made it effective on the day of receipt, thereby effectively terminating Parker's employment without giving the required three months' notice, or whether Parker made the decision not to report to work for the three-month period, thereby effectively terminating his employment without giving the required three-months' notice. In light of the unresolved factual issue, summary judgment was inappropriate, making erroneous both the trial court's grant of summary judgment to appellees on Parker's counterclaim, and the Court of Appeals' affirmance of that judgment.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Fletcher, C.J., who concurs in the judgment only in Division 2.
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