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Parker v. Crider Poultry6/24/2002
Appellant Jeffrey Parker formerly served as president and chief executive officer of appellees Crider, Inc., and Crider Poultry. In May 1998, while serving in those positions, Parker sent a letter resigning his positions effective August 1998. The Crider corporations filed suit against him seeking repayment of a bonus advanced to Parker and damages for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Parker filed a counterclaim in which he claimed appellees had breached his employment agreement by refusing to honor the three-month notice period set out in the parties' agreement by either permitting him to work for the three months between the date of his notice and the effective date of his resignation, or by paying him his salary for the three-month period. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to appellees on the counterclaim and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's action. Parker v. Crider Poultry, 249 Ga. App. 381 (549 SE2d 711) (2001). We granted Parker's petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals, asking whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that Parker could not recover on his claim for breach of the notice provision.
1. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals based their judgments on the interplay between the Statute of Frauds and a letter drafted and signed by W. A. Crider, Jr., on behalf of the Crider corporations, and counter-signed by appellant Parker. The letter set forth the base salary to be paid Parker, the formula for computing an incentive bonus, appellant's title and starting date, other benefits, and provided "Three months notice for either party." Citing Gatins v. NCR Corp., 180 Ga. App. 595 (349 SE2d 818) (1986), the trial court determined that appellant's claim failed because the letter agreement did not comply with the Statute of Frauds since "a writing with an indefinite term does not comply with the statute." The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on the ground that the letter agreement was a contract that the State of Frauds required to be in writing because "the performance of [Parker's] employment agreement was not to be completed within one year" since he had submitted his letter of resignation more than two years after he had started working for Crider. Our review of the law leads us to conclude that both courts erred in their determination that the employment agreement between Parker and the Crider corporations fell within the Statute of Frauds.
The letter agreement did not state the duration of the term of employment. An employment contract containing no definite term of employment is terminable at the will of either party. Ford Clinic v. Potter, 246 Ga. App. 320 (540 SE2d 275) (2001); Burton v. John Thurmond Const. Co., 201 Ga. App. 10 (410 SE2d 137) (1991). A contract of employment of indefinite duration does not fall within the Statute of Frauds. Wood v. Dan P. Holl & Co., 169 Ga. App. 839 (2) (315 SE2d 51) (1984) (overruling Sams v. Duncan & Copeland, 153 Ga. App. 765 (266 SE2d 546) (1980), in which the court had held that an employment agreement of indefinite duration fell within the purview of the Statute of Frauds). This is so because, at its inception, a contract of employment for an indefinite duration is an agreement capable of being performed within one year, and the possibility of performance of the contract within one year is sufficient to remove it from the Statue of Frauds. Bibb Distrib. Co. v. Stewart, 238 Ga. App. 650, 654 (519 SE2d 455) (1999). The number of years the parties operate under an employment contract of indefinite duration does not affect the applicability of the Statute of Frauds. See e.g., Wood v. Dan P. Holl Co., supra, 169 Ga. App. 821, where the employee had worke
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