 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Seabolt v. Beaulieu of America6/12/2002
.00 for 17.5 hours is a reasonable value for the services of the employee's attorney and therefore assesses attorney fees in that amount against the employer/self-insurer."
Dissatisfied, Beaulieu appealed to the Superior Court of Murray County. After review of the award entered by the appellate division, the superior court affirmed on all issues with the exception of attorney fees. The superior court deduced that the absence of any discussion by the ALJ about attorney fees "could be an oversight or could be an implicit denial of them." The court noted, "Since the imposition of attorney's fees is discretionary under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b) and the intent of the ALJ is unclear, the Appellate Division should remand the issue of the award for clarification by the ALJ." On that basis, the superior court directed the board to remand the attorney fees issue to the ALJ for resolution.
In her sole enumeration of error, Dockrey contends that the superior court erred by reversing the decision of the appellate division and directing the appellate division to remand the issue of attorney fees to the ALJ. We agree and reverse.
The Workers' Compensation Act empowers the ALJ and the board to assess attorney fees in these circumstances: "Upon a determination that proceedings have been brought, prosecuted, or defended in whole or in part without reasonable grounds, the administrative law judge or the board may assess the adverse attorney's fee against the offending party." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 34-9-108 (b) (1). Here, that is precisely what occurred. The board expressly found that Beaulieu had defended against part of Dockrey's claim without having reasonable grounds for doing so. Accordingly, the board assessed attorney fees under OCGA § 34-9-108 (b) (1) against Beaulieu, the offending party. The board also entered a factual finding that $3,500 was the reasonable value of the legal services.
Whether an employer has unreasonably defended against a claim in whole or in part is a factual determination. Richardson v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 663, 665 (458 SE2d 694) (1995). When supported by any evidence, findings of fact by the state board are conclusive and binding on reviewing courts, and judges lack authority to set aside an award based on disagreement with the board's conclusions. Gleaton v. Hazelwood Farms, 214 Ga. App. 825, 826 (449 SE2d 170) (1994). When, as here, the appellate division substitutes its findings for those of the ALJ, the superior court reviewing the appellate division's findings must affirm when there is evidence to support the appellate division's substitute findings. Syntec Indus. v. Godfrey, 269 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (496 SE2d 905) (1998). Because the appellate division acted within its discretionary authority to assess attorney fees and the record contains evidence to support the assessment of fees as well as the amount assessed, the superior court erred in reversing the appellate division. See Bankhead Enterprises v. Beavers, 267 Ga. 506, 508 (480 SE2d 840) (1997). That judgment therefore must be reversed but only as to the issue of attorney fees. See Richardson, supra at 66.
Judgment reversed.
Eldridge and Ellington, JJ., concur.
Page 1 2 Georgia Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|