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Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist.6/18/2002
As modified July 11, 2002; no change in judgment.
CRAIG BELL, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT,
v.
VISTA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, J. Richard Haden, Judge. Reversed. (Super. Ct. No. 715105)
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Benke, Acting P. J.
Petition for rehearing denied July 11, 2002.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
SUMMARY
In this case respondent Craig Bell, a football coach who had been terminated by appellant Vista Unified School District (the district), successfully argued the district had violated the Ralph M. Brown Act (Brown Act). (Gov. Code, ยง 54950 et seq.) Initially, the trial court awarded Bell $157,674 in attorney fees and costs, which included fees incurred in prosecuting tort claims against the district.
In a prior appeal, Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 681-684, we upheld the trial court's finding the district had violated the Brown Act in failing to give Bell notice that it was considering termination of his employment and the right to a public hearing on those claims. However, we reversed the trial court's initial attorney fee award because it included fees incurred in prosecuting tort claims against the district. We agreed with Bell that fees incurred with respect to issues common to both the Brown Act and the tort claim could be recovered. However, we also found that Bell's Brown Act claims were quite distinct from his tort claims and that given that sharp distinction, Bell and the trial court were required to make a good faith effort to apportion fees between recoverable Brown Act fees and nonrecoverable fees related to Bell's tort claims. (Id. at p. 688.) We stated: "This case only involves a single violation of the Brown Act, the failure to provide Bell under section 54957 with 24-hour written notice the Board intended to consider a charge or complaint against him in closed session and advising him of his right to have the matter heard in public. The four causes of action for injunctive relief, alternative writ of mandamus, peremptory writ of mandamus and declaratory relief all sought redress for the same Brown Act violation. Consistent with section 54957, they sought a declaration VUSD violated the Brown Act and Bell's entitlement to an open session regarding this matter, as well as his reinstatement since any disciplinary action taken by the Board against him in closed session on the specific complaint based on the CIF undue influence finding was expressly null and void under the statute. However, the primary economic focus of this litigation underlying the 11 remaining causes of action was Bell's perception he was wrongfully terminated from his football coach position, the victim of a retaliatory firing for exposing the misconduct of other VUSD officials, and his quest for damages. Although the Brown Act violation may have procedurally facilitated the wrongful termination or retaliatory firing, it did not substantively beget it. Simply stated, they constitute two separate and distinct claims, one entitled to statutory fees and the other not." (Ibid.)
We found there had been no good faith effort to apportion fees in large measure because th
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