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Kelly v. Webster11/15/2002
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's denial of their motion for new trial. AFFIRMED.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court's denial of their motion for new trial following a jury verdict finding defendants negligent, but finding no proximate cause. Plaintiffs contend the district court erroneously submitted the affirmative defenses of sudden emergency and sole proximate cause to the jury. They argue the jury's verdict was inconsistent with the law and the evidence, requiring a new trial on the sole issue of damages. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On the afternoon of October 23, 1998, five-year-old Brandon Kelly attempted to cross West Madison Street in Marshalltown. At that time, Ronald Webster was driving a 22,000-pound empty dump truck back from the local landfill on his last run of the day. As Webster approached from the west, Brandon ran out into the street. Webster applied his brakes immediately. Brandon ran across the street and was struck four feet south of the curb. The dump truck came to rest on Brandon's legs.
Brandon's mother, Cindy Kelly, brought a negligence suit against Webster and his employer, Con-struct, Inc., on her son's behalf. Plaintiffs alleged Webster was driving too fast for conditions, failed to maintain a proper lookout, and failed to keep his truck under control. Defendants denied negligence, alleging comparative fault on the part of Brandon and his mother. Defendants also pled the affirmative defense of "sudden emergency" and alleged that the speed in which Brandon appeared in the street constituted the sole proximate cause of any damages suffered by Brandon or his mother.
At trial, Webster testified he had lived in the neighborhood in which the accident occurred from 1984 until 1990. He had previously seen young children in the area crossing the street. He also testified he knew the braking system on the dump truck he drove was not as responsive as that of a car.
West Madison Street is a truck route with a posted speed limit of 30 mph. Webster estimated he was traveling between 25 and 30 mph just before the accident. A motorist traveling behind Webster estimated his own speed to be between 30 and 35 mph, and testified he was driving at the same speed as Webster. Both parties hired reconstruction experts who calculated speed ranges based on physical evidence. Plaintiff's expert estimated Webster's speed between 28 and 34 mph. The defense expert estimated Webster was traveling within the range of 27 and 32 mph.
Webster testified that he did not see Brandon before he appeared in front of his truck in the eastbound lane of traffic, almost across the street. Following the accident, Webster stated, "I didn't see him, I didn't see him."
The jury was instructed on the defenses of sudden emergency and sole proximate cause. The jury was not instructed on comparative fault. In response to interrogatories, the jury found Webster negligent, but found his negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiffs' damages. The court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial, which the court denied.
II. Jury Instructions.
Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in submitting the jury instructions on sudden emergency and sole proximate cause. We review errors in jury instructions for corrections of errors at law. Cato v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 622 N.W.2d 486, 492 (Iowa 2001). Error in giving a jury instruction does not merit reversal unless the complaining party has been prejudiced. Hoskinson v. City of Iowa City, 621 N.W.2d 425, 426 (Iowa 2001).
A. Sudden Emergency.
Plaintiffs argue the in
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