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McGee v. Lumber12/22/2000
t reversed the Industrial Commission's decision, finding that Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enterprises, 126 Idaho at 129, 879 P.2d at 592, was directly applicable to the facts in Demain. Id. at 784, 979 P.2d at 657. Consequently, Demain was not entitled to recover as he had not established that he suffered from an accident. Id. at 785, 979 P.2d at 658.
In this case, the referee found that McGee developed degenerative joint disease in the low back while he was employed at Erdman in the time period ranging from 1988 to 1991. Additionally, the referee found that McGee "suffered an industrial accident and injury on January 20, 1992, when he slipped and fell at J.D. Lumber sustaining a bulging disc at L5-S1, and lit up the pre-existing degenerative joint disease." The referee found McGee did not suffer a compensable accident which aggravated the pre-existing condition in May or July 1994.
Like the claimant in Demain, McGee is not entitled to recover under Idaho workers' compensation law for the pain he suffered after the 1994 incidents because McGee did not establish that an accident occurred. Consequently, the Commission's finding that McGee is not entitled to compensation resulting from the 1994 incident is affirmed.
McGee also argues that the Industrial Commission applied an incorrect causation analysis in reaching its determination that McGee's back spasms and psychological condition were not causally related to the 1992 accident.
Following the September 1998 hearing, Referee Peggy McMahon found McGee's back spasms and psychological condition were not the direct and natural consequences of the 1992 accident. The referee cited to various facts including: 1) McGee continued hard physical labor during the time period spanning from March 1992 to May of 1994; 2) McGee did not get medical help during that two-year time period; 3) McGee began suffering back spasms more than two years after his industrial accident; 4) The back pain experienced in 1994 involved different and increased symptoms from that experienced prior to the incident.
In regards to McGee's psychological condition, the referee noted that Dr. Mays, a psychologist, testified that a person such as McGee, who becomes physically injured, becomes vulnerable to depression which amplifies the pain and physical discomfort. However, Dr. Mays could not verify whether McGee's depression was caused by the 1992 accident or the 1994 incidents.
The causation analysis performed by the Commission supports the conclusion that McGee's condition in 1994 was not related to the 1992 accident. However, a more compelling reason for denying McGee the relief he requests is the fact that McGee did not establish that an accident occurred in 1994 which aggravated his pre-existing condition or occupational disease. We hold there is substantial and competent evidence to support the Industrial Commission's finding.
D. MCGEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES.
McGee requested attorney fees, however he did not cite to any authority or provide argument in support of his request. Attorney fees will not be awarded on appeal when no statutory authority has been cited in support of the request. Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enterprises, 126 Idaho at 133, 879 P.2d at 595. Consequently, McGee is not entitled to attorney fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the issues to be determined at the first hearing were somewhat confused by the various communications that took place between the referee and the various parties involved, McGee had notice that liability was to be discussed at the first hearing. In this case, medical stability relates to liability, so McGee should hav
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