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Palazzolo v. Joe's Delivery Service2/11/2003
In this workers' compensation case, the Second Injury Fund appeals from the final award of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) finding Second Injury Fund liability. The Second Injury Fund asserts that the Commission erred in holding that an injury resulting in a 15% permanent partial disability at the 110-week level of the foot constitutes an injury to a "major extremity" under Section 287.220.1 RSMo (2000) and consequently erred in finding the Second Injury Fund liable for claimant's injury.
Claimant entered into a stipulation for compromise settlement with his employer arising out of his claim for injuries suffered in the course of his employment on October 4, 1996. The settlement was for a lump sum in the amount of $4,433.88 based on a disability rating of 15% of the left foot at the 110-week level. Claimant then made a claim for permanent partial disability against the Second Injury Fund, on the basis of his prior injury to his lower back that had been settled by stipulation for 27.5% permanent partial disability for the body as a whole.
The sole issue before the ALJ was whether a 15% permanent partial disability of the foot at the 110-week level constitutes an injury to a "major extremity" under Section 287.220.1. The ALJ found that the injury constituted an injury to a major extremity and issued an award against the Second Injury Fund granting claimant compensation in the amount of $3,399.31. The Commission affirmed. The Second Injury Fund appeals.
For its sole point on appeal, the Second Injury Fund contends that the Commission erred in finding that claimant's injury to the foot at the 110-week level met the statutory threshold for Second Injury Fund liability. The Second Injury Fund argues that the term "major extremity" in Section 287.220.1 does not include the foot at the 110-week level.
We review decisions of the Commission which are clearly interpretations of law for correctness without deference to the Commission's judgment. West v. Posten Const. Co., 804 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Mo. banc 1991); Soos v. Mallinckrodt Chemical Co., 19 S.W.3d 683, 685 (Mo.App. 2000). In worker's compensation cases, we broadly and liberally interpret the law with a view to the public interest and with an understanding that the law is intended to extend its benefits to the largest possible class. West, 804 S.W.2d at 745-46 (quoting Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Service, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo. banc 1983)).
Section 287.220 directs when compensation is to be paid from the Second Injury Fund, as well as the amount of such compensation, in " ll cases of permanent disability where there has been previous disability." Hughey v. Chrysler Corp., 34 S.W.3d 845, 847 (Mo.App. 2000). "'Permanent partial disability' means a disability that is permanent in nature and partial in degree." Section 287.190.6 RSMo (2000). The Second Injury Fund is liable for permanent partial disability benefits as follows:
If any employee who has a pre-existing permanent partial disability whether from compensable injury or otherwise, of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment or to obtaining reemployment if the employee becomes unemployed, and the pre-existing permanent partial disability, if a body as a whole injury, equals a minimum of fifty weeks of compensation or, if a major extremity injury only, equals a minimum of fifteen percent permanent partial disability, according to the medical standards that are used in determining such compensation, receives a subsequent compensable injury resulting in additional permanent partial disability so that the degree or percentage of disability, in an amount equal to a minimum of
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