Stroka v. United Airlines11/26/2003
titioner watched the tragedy replayed on television over the next few days. She cried, trembled and could not sleep. Initially, she was unable to eat; then she began to binge.
Since September 24, 2001, Dr. Stephen Clarfield, a psychologist, has treated petitioner for post-traumatic stress syndrome on a biweekly basis. Petitioner has been upset, forgetful and has had trouble sleeping. She has not returned to work. She remains afraid, having learned of the brutal way the hijackers murdered the flight attendants on the plane. She has panic attacks when she sees a runway. Petitioner is overwhelmed by guilt, knowing that her vacation day caused a co-employee to die. Her best friends were tortured and killed. The parties agree that petitioner is temporarily totally disabled as a result of her disorder, and requires ongoing psychiatric treatment.
To be entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -142, an employee's accidental injury must"aris out of and in the course of employment." Jumpp v. City of Ventnor, 177 N.J. 470, 476 (2003); N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. Although the Act has been broadly interpreted to bring as many cases as possible within its coverage, Silagy v. State, 105 N.J. Super. 507, 510 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 54 N.J. 506 (1969), it was amended by the Legislature in 1979 to"reduce costs by, among other things,'sharply curtail[ing compensability for] off-premises accidents.'" Jumpp, supra, 177 N.J. at 477 (quoting Hon. Alfred J. Napier, Impact of the Reform Act of 1980, 96 N.J. Lawyer, 17, 18 (Summer 1981)).
Employment, as defined in the Act subsequent to its amendment, is:
eemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer's place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer's place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer; provided, however, when the employee is required by the employer to be away from the employer's place of employment, the employee shall be deemed to be in the course of employment when the employee is engaged in the direct performance of duties assigned or directed by the employer.... [N.J.S.A. 34:15-36].
Whether an accident arose out of and in the course of employment is a two-part question. First, to establish that the accident arose out of employment, a petitioner must demonstrate a causal connection between the employment and the accident. Coleman v. Cycle Transformer Corp., 105 N.J. 285, 289 (1986). Second, to prove whether the accident occurred in the course of employment, a petitioner must show a time and place connection between the employment and the accident. Ibid.
We first address whether petitioner's disorder arose out of her employment. To qualify, her employment must have been a contributing cause of the injury, so that the risk of the occurrence was reasonably incidental to her employment. Coleman, supra, 105 N.J. at 290. Although" n employee does not have to be actually engaged in work for the employer at the time of an accident" for the disability to have arisen out of the employment, Buerkle v. United Parcel Serv., 26 N.J. Super. 404, 407-08 (App. Div. 1953), the disorder must, however,"issue from or be contributed to by conditions which bear some essential relation to the work or its nature." Williams v. Western Elec. Co., 178 N.J. Super. 571, 585 (App. Div. 1981). An injury arises out of the employment if"it is more probable that the injury would not have occurred under the normal circumstances of everyday life outside of the employment."
Coleman, supra, 105 N.J. at 291. The risk of the occurrence may fall into one of three categories: 1) those distinctly ass
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