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Hampton v. Armand Corporation11/18/2003
tion." Lau v. Behr Heat Transfer Sys., Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1023 (D.S.D. 2001). This Congressional goal was tempered, however, by the needs of the employer. Among the FMLA's stated purposes are,"to accomplish the purposes [of the Act]... in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers," 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(b)(3), and"to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families...." 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(b)(1). Congress helped achieve this balance by limiting claims under the FMLA to employees who have worked for the same employer for"at least 12 months...." 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2)(A)(i); see also Hundley v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 774 N.E.2d 330, 335 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)." he policy behind the FMLA does not require employers to grant leave to employees who have not been employed for a year or longer." Ibid. The one-year limitation of the FMLA, representing an accommodation to employers, therefore helps shape the public policy underlying the legislation. See Coleman v. Prudential Relocation, 975 F. Supp. 234, 245 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (only eligible employee can engage in protected activity); 29 C.F.R. § 825.101 (enactment of FMLA predicated upon needs of workers and"development of high-performance organizations").
The FMLA establishes a clear mandate of public policy for"eligible employees" wrongfully terminated pursuant to its provisions. That such a public policy exists, however, does not translate to a public policy that protects short-term employees. Under plaintiff's theory, an employee who has been barred from filing a direct FMLA claim because the employee has been working for less than twelve months could indirectly achieve the same result by filing a Pierce claim based on the FMLA's public policy. Such a result would undermine the balance Congress sought to achieve in enacting the twelve-month limitation. We are obliged to recognize and respect this clearly expressed legislative design.
We briefly address two additional issues raised by plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that notwithstanding the FMLA, New Jersey's broad public policy protects employees from being terminated for taking sick leave, no matter how long they have been employed. To support this contention, plaintiff points to the policy against terminating an employee who makes a worker's compensation claim, Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 669 (1981); against terminating an employee for reporting an unsafe workplace condition, LePore v. National Tool Mfg. Co., 224 N.J. Super. 463, 466, aff'd, 115 N.J. 226 (1989); and the general goal to"fight to eradicate the cancer of unlawful discrimination of all types from our society," Anderson v. Exxon Co., 89 N.J. 483, 492 (1982). These well-settled objectives, however, do not reflect a public policy in this state against terminating an employee for taking sick leave. They represent a policy of protecting employees against retaliatory and discriminatory conduct in specific situations. But, they do not support plaintiff's argument that New Jersey's broad public policy protects employees for being terminated for taking sick leave. See MacDougall, supra, 144 N.J. at 391-92; Pierce, supra, 84 N.J. at 72.
Notably, New Jersey has enacted the Family Leave Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11B-1 to -- 16, which permits an employee (who has been employed for twelve months) to take leave for the"birth or placement for adoption of a child or serious health condition of a family member," N.J.S.A. 34:11B-2, but does not provide an employee leave for his own illness. The State Legislature has not expressed a public policy that protects an employee, no matter how long employed, from being discharged for taking medical leave for his or her own illness. Nor is there any judicial precede
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