 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Stanley v. Coca-Cola Enterprises11/10/2003
(not designated for permanent publication)
INTRODUCTION
Mike Stanley appeals from an order of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court review panel affirming the trial court's finding in favor of the appellees, Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. (Coca-Cola), and Constitution State Service Company, Coca-Cola's workers' compensation insurance carrier. The review panel found that Stanley's back injuries did not arise out of and in the course of Stanley's employment with Coca-Cola. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On January 4, 2001, Stanley worked a full day in the warehouse at Coca-Cola. As a warehouse worker, Stanley drove a forklift at times and also stacked cases of pop on pallets to be loaded onto delivery trucks. While at work on January 4, Stanley did not do anything "out of the ordinary" or experience any back pain.
In the early morning hours of January 5, 2001, Stanley got out of bed to go to the bathroom and experienced severe back pain. Although Stanley had been roughhousing with his son the previous evening, he did not think that he injured his back during that time. Because his back continued to hurt, Stanley told his supervisor about his back pain when he went to work later in the day. Stanley's supervisor told Stanley not to work but to go to Saint Elizabeth Company Care and have his back "checked out."
A physician's assistant and a doctor from Saint Elizabeth Company Care both examined Stanley. In notes dated January 10, 2001, the physician's assistant stated that in her opinion, Stanley was "suffering from a thoracic musculoskeletal strain secondary to his work requirements." In notes dated January 16, 2001, the doctor also stated that Stanley's pain " ppears to be muscular in origin. . . . Etiology of back pain is uncertain Expert Opinion.
On appeal, Stanley argues that the trial court erred in failing to exclude the opinion of Phillips because there was no foundation for Phillips' opinion. Specifically, Stanley argues that Phillips' opinion did not have foundation because Phillips never examined him, but, rather, based his opinion on medical records from Stanley's other doctors. We do not agree.
An expert medical witness may base an opinion on the medical records of another treating doctor when the records are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field. Vacanti v. Master Electronics Corp., 245 Neb. 586, 514 N.W.2d 319 (1994), citing Clark v. Clark, 220 Neb. 771, 371 N.W.2d 749 (1985). See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-703 (Reissue 1995).
Additionally, in our review of an error directed at the admission or exclusion of evidence, we note that the Workers' Compensation Court is not bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence. Paulsen v. State, 249 Neb. 112, 541 N.W.2d 636 (1996), citing Sherard v. Bethphage Mission, Inc., 236 Neb. 900, 464 N.W.2d 343 (1991). See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-168 (Reissue 1998). Admission of evidence is within the discretion of the Workers' Compensation Court, whose determination in this regard will not be reversed upon appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Paulsen v. State, supra, citing Harpham v. General Cas. Co., 232 Neb. 568, 441 N.W.2d 600 (1989). Given the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the instant case.
Pre-existing Scheuermann's Kyphosis
Stanley contends that the trial court erred in failing to find that Stanley's pre-existing Scheuermann's kyphosis was made painful by his work-related activities at Coca-Cola.
In a letter dated July 16, 2001, Vande Guchte stated:
Although no particular work injury has
Page 1 2 3 Nebraska Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|