 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Burns v. General Motors Corporation11/11/2003
se, safety or value. We agree with the defendant.
At the outset, we set forth our standard of review. Judicial review of lemon law arbitration awards are governed by § 42-181 (c) (4), which provides in relevant part: "The court shall conduct a de novo review of the questions of law raised in the application. . . . In reviewing questions of fact, the court shall uphold the award unless it determines that the factual findings of the arbitrators are not supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the substantial rights of the moving party have been prejudiced. If the arbitrators fail to state findings or reasons for the award, or the stated findings or reasons are inadequate, the court shall search the record to determine whether a basis exists to uphold the award. . . ." Section 42-181 (c) (4) confines the court's review of the application "to the record of the proceedings before the arbitration panel. . . ." General Statutes § 42-181 (c) (4).
Our Supreme Court has determined that in reviewing questions of fact in arbitration proceedings, "a reviewing court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the arbitrators' findings of fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable." General Motors Corp. v. Dohmann, 247 Conn. 274, 281-82, 722 A.2d 1205 (1998).
"This so-called substantial evidence rule is similar to the sufficiency of the evidence standard applied in judicial review of jury verdicts, and evidence is sufficient to sustain ... finding if it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . The fact that a possibility exists that two inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence does not prevent the arbitrators' finding from being supported by substantial evidence." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Zasun, 52 Conn. App. 212, 225, 725 A.2d 406 (1999). With those principles in mind, we address the merits of the defendant's claim.
Here, the court searched the record before the panel and proceeded to weigh the evidence itself, concluding that "no basis exists to uphold the award in favor of the defendant." Our Supreme Court has articulated the deference due to an arbitration panel's credibility judgments by a reviewing court when applying the substantial evidence standard: " n determining whether an [arbitration panel's] finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer . . . to the [arbitration panel's] right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part. . . . This limited standard of review dictates that, ith regard to questions of fact, it is neither the function of the trial court nor of this court to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the [arbitration panel]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) General Motors Corp. v. Dohmann, supra, 247 Conn. 282.
Thus, a court must limit its review of questions of fact in lemon law arbitrations to whether there exists sufficient evidence in the record to constitute substantial evidence in support of the arbitration panel's findings. Conversely, the court must avoid, as has happened in the present case, overstepping the scope of its review by weighing the credibility of the evidence.
Here, the court was persuaded, unlike the arbitration panel, by the plaintiffs' expert testimony. It found the defendant's expert's testimony unpersuasive because "he never examined or took this vehicle on a test drive." It further found the plaintiff's expert, John Reed, " credible and persuasive." The court then went on to find
Page 1 2 3 Connecticut Employee Leasing Services
Employee Leasing Services
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Employee Leasing Services in your area.
|
|